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Abstract
We study online learnability of a wide class of problems, extending the results of [25] to general no-
tions of performance measure well beyond external regret. Our framework simultaneously captures such
well-known notions as internal and general Φ-regret, learning with non-additive global cost functions,
Blackwell’s approachability, calibration of forecasters, adaptive regret, and more. We show that learn-
ability in all these situations is due to control of the same three quantities: a martingale convergence
term, a term describing the ability to perform well if future is known, and a generalization of sequential
Rademacher complexity, studied in [25]. Since we directly study complexity of the problem instead of
focusing on efficient algorithms, we are able to improve and extend many known results which have been
previously derived via an algorithmic construction.
1 Introduction
In the companion paper [25], we analyzed learnability in the Online Learning Model when the value of the
game is defined through minimax regret. However, regret (also known as external regret) is not the only way
to measure performance of an online learning procedure. In the present paper, we extend the results of [25]
to other performance measures, encompassing a wide spectrum of notions which appear in the literature.
Our framework gives the same footing to external regret, internal and general Φ-regret, learning with non-
additive global cost functions, Blackwell’s approachability, calibration of forecasters, adaptive regret, and
more. We recover, extend, and improve some existing results, and (what is more important) show that they
all follow from control of the same quantities. In particular, sequential Rademacher complexity, introduced
in [25], plays a key role in these derivations.
A reflection on the past two decades of research in learning theory reveals (in our somewhat biased view)
an interesting difference between Statistical Learning Theory and Online Learning. In the former, the focus
has been primarily on understanding complexity measures rather than algorithms. There are good reasons
for this: if a supervised problem with i.i.d. data is learnable, Empirical Risk Minimization is the algorithm
that will perform well if one disregards computational aspects. In contrast, Online Learning has been mainly
centered around algorithms. Given an algorithm, a non-trivial bound serves as a certificate that the problem
is learnable. This algorithm-focused approach has dominated research in Online Learning for several decades.
Many important tools (such as optimization-based algorithms for online convex optimization) have emerged,
yet the results lacked a unified approach for determining learnability.
With the tools developed in [25], the question of learnability can now be addressed in a variety of situations
in a unified manner. In fact, [25] presents a number of examples of provably learnable problems for which
computationally feasible online learning methods have not yet been developed. In the present paper, we
show that the scope of problems whose learnability and precise rates can be characterized is much larger
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than those defined in [25] through external regret. Within this circle of problems are such well-known results
as Blackwell’s approachability and calibration of forecasters. For instance, our complexity-based (rather
than algorithm-based) approach yields a proof of Blackwell’s approachability in Banach spaces without
ever mentioning an algorithm. Let us remark that Blackwell’s approachability has been a key tool for
showing learnability [8]; as our results imply approachability, they can be utilized whenever Blackwell’s
approachability has been successful. The results can also be used in situations where phrasing a problem as
an approachability question is not necessarily natural. In Section 5.2, we discuss the relation of our results
to approachability in greater detail.
Our contributions can be broken down into three parts.
• The first contribution lies in the formulation of the online learning problem, with a performance
measure (a form of regret), defined in terms of certain payoff transformation mappings. While this
formulation might appear unusual, we show that it is general enough to encompass many seemingly
different frameworks (games), yet specific enough that we can provide generic upper bounds.
• The second contribution is in developing upper and lower bounds on the value of the game under
various natural assumptions. These tools allow us to deal with performance measures well beyond the
standard notion of external regret. Such performance measures include smooth non-additive functions
of payoffs, generalizing the “cumulative payoff” notion often considered in the literature. The abstract
definition in terms of payoff transformations lets us consider rich classes of mappings whose complexity
can be studied through random averages, covering numbers, and combinatorial parameters.
• We apply our machinery to a number of well-known problems. (a) First, for the usual notion of
external regret, the results boil down to those of [25]. (b) For the more general Φ-regret (see e.g.
[26, 15, 16]), we recover and improve several known results. In particular, for convergence to Φ-
correlated equilibria, we improve upon the results of Stoltz and Lugosi [26]. (c) We study the game of
Blackwell’s approachability [4] in (possibly infinite-dimensional) separable Banach spaces. Specifically,
we show that martingale convergence in these spaces (along with Blackwell’s one-shot approachability
condition) is both necessary and sufficient for Blackwell’s approachability to hold. (d) We also consider
the game of calibrated forecasting. We improve upon the results of Mannor and Stoltz [22] and prove (to
the best of our knowledge) the first known O(T−1/2) rates for calibration with more than 2 outcomes.
Our approach is markedly different from those found in the literature. (e) We use our framework to
study games with global cost functions and as an example we extend the bounds recently obtained
by Even-Dar et al [10]. (f) We provide techniques for bounding notions of regret where algorithm’s
performance is measured against a time-varying comparator (see e.g. [18, 6, 27]). Such notions of
regret are better suited for reactive environments. Using the general tools we developed, we not only
recover the results in [18, 6] but also extend them to prove learnability and obtain rates for much more
general settings. Our last example shows that adaptive regret notion of Hazan and Seshadhri [17] can
be defined in greater generality while still preserving learnability.
The intent of this paper is to provide a framework and tools for studying problems that can be phrased as
repeated games. However, unlike much of existing research in online learning, we are not solving the general
problem by exhibiting an algorithm and studying its performance. Rather, we proceed by directly attacking
the value of the game. Alas, the value is a complicated object, and the non-invitingly long sequence of
infima and suprema can single-handedly extinguish any desire to study it. Our results attest to the power
of symmetrization, which emerges as a key tool for studying the value of the game. In the literature,
symmetrization has been used for i.i.d. data [13]. In [25, 1], it was shown that symmetrization can also
be used in situations beyond the traditional setting. What is even more surprising, we are able to employ
symmetrization ideas even when the objective function is not a summation of terms but rather a global
function of many variables. We hope that these tools can have an impact not only on online learning but
also on game theory.
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We believe that there are many more examples falling under the present framework. We only chose a few
to demonstrate how upper and lower bounds arise from the complexity of the problem. Along with an
upper bound, a (computationally inefficient) algorithm can always be recovered from the minimax analysis.
Finding efficient algorithms is often a difficult enterprise, and it is important to be able to understand the
inherent complexity even before focusing on computation.
Let us spend a minute describing the organization of this paper. Since our results are meant to serve as
a unifying framework, we faced the question of whether to build up the level of generality as we progress
through the paper, or whether to start with the most general results and then make them more specific.
We decided to do the latter. While we find this flow of general-to-specific more natural, we risk losing
potential readers on the first few pages. In hopes of avoiding this, after defining the online learning problem
in full generality in Section 2, we briefly state how various well-known frameworks appear as particular
instances. Then, in Section 3, learnability is established under various very general assumptions. Next, in
Section 4, techniques for proving lower bounds are shown. Various examples and frameworks are considered
in more detail in Section 5. In Section 6, the “in-probability” analogues are derived. Hannan consistency is
established via almost sure convergence. For an overview of the results without the painful details, one may
read Section 2 and then skip to Section 5. For the sake of readability, most of the proofs are deferred to the
appendix. Let us remark that [25] is not required for reading this paper. In a few places, however, if a proof
is basically the same as in [25] except for notation, we will omit the proof.
2 The Setting
At a very abstract level, the problem of online learning can be phrased as that of optimization of a given
function RT (f1, x1, . . . , fT , xT ) with coordinates being chosen sequentially by the player and the adversary.
Of course, at this level of generality not much can be said. Hence, we make some minimal assumptions on the
function RT which lead to meaningful guarantees on the online optimization process.
1 These assumptions
are satisfied by a number of natural performance measures, as illustrated by the examples below.
Let F and X be the sets of moves of the learner (player) and the adversary, respectively. Generalizing the
Online Learning Model considered in [25], we study the following T -round interaction between the learner
and the adversary:
On round t = 1, . . . , T ,
• the learner chooses a mixed strategy qt (distribution on F)
• the adversary picks xt ∈ X
• the learner draws ft ∈ F from qt and receives payoff (loss) signal `(ft, xt) ∈ H
End
We would like to specify that we are in the full information setting and that at the end of each round both
the player and the adversary observe each other’s moves ft, xt. The payoff space H is a (not necessarily
convex) subset of a separable Banach space B. Both the player and the adversary can be randomized and
adaptive.
The goal of the learner is to minimize the following general form of performance measure:
RT = B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))− inf
φ∈ΦT
B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT )) , (1)
where
1The question of general conditions on the function under which such sequential minimization is possible was put forth by
Peter Bartlett a few years ago in a coffee conversation. This paper paves way towards addressing this question.
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• The function ` : F × X 7→ H is an H-valued payoff (or loss) function.
• The function B : HT 7→ R is a (not necessarily additive or convex) form of cumulative payoff.
• The set ΦT consists of sequences φ = (φ1, . . . , φT ) of measurable payoff transformation mappings
φt : HF×X 7→ HF×X that transform the payoff function ` into a payoff function `φt .
The goal of the adversary is to maximize the same quantity (1), making it a zero-sum game.
This paper is concerned with learnability and with identifying complexity measures that govern learnability.
But complexity of what should we focus on? After all, the general online learning problem is defined by the
choice of five components: B, `,F ,X , and ΦT . In [25], the choice was easy: it should be the complexity of the
function class F that plays the key role. That was natural because the payoff was written as `(f, x) = f(x),
which suggested that the function class F is the object of study. The present formulation, however, is much
more general. When this work commenced, it seemed likely that complexity of the problem will be some
interaction between the complexity of ΦT and complexity of F . As we show below, one may just focus on
the complexity of ΦT , while F and X are now on the same footing. For instance, even if it might seem
unusual at first, we will introduce a notion of a cover of the set of sequences of payoff transformations ΦT .
In summary, while all five components B, `,F ,X , and ΦT play a role in determining learnability, we will
mainly refer to the complexity of the payoff mapping ` and the payoff transformation ΦT without an explicit
reference to F , X , and B. We emphasize that most flexibility comes from the payoff mapping ` and from
the transformations ΦT of the payoffs.
In particular, important classes of payoff transformation mappings are the departure mappings that transform
the payoff function ` by acting only on the first argument of `, i.e. only modifying the row (player’s action)
choice.
Definition 1. A class of sequences of payoff transformations ΦT is said to be a departure mapping class if
there exists a class Φ′T of sequences φ
′ = (φ′1, . . . , φ
′
T ) with φ
′
i : F 7→ F such that for each φ ∈ ΦT there
exists a φ′ ∈ Φ′T with the property that, for all t ∈ [T ], f ∈ F and x ∈ X , the payoff transformations can be
written as `φt(f, x) := `(φ
′
t(f), x).
For payoff transformation classes that are departure mapping classes, the transformations ΦT can be iden-
tified in terms of a corresponding class of departure mapping from F to itself, and we shall abuse notation
and use ΦT to represent both the class of payoff transformation and the class of departure mappings from
F to itself. Another class of interest are payoff transformations that do not vary with time.
Definition 2. We say that ΦT is time-invariant if all sequences of payoff transformation are constant in
time: ΦT = {(φ, . . . , φ) : φ ∈ Φ}, where Φ is a “basis” class of mappings HF×X 7→ HF×X .
In the following, we assume that F and X are subsets of a separable metric space. Let Q and P be the sets
of probability distributions on F and X , respectively. Assume that Q and P are weakly compact. From
the outset, we assume that the adversary is non-oblivious (that is, adaptive). Formally, define a learner’s
strategy pi as a sequence of mappings pit : (P × F × X )t−1 7→ Q for each t ∈ [T ]. The form (1) of the
performance measure gives rise to the value of the game:
VT (`,ΦT ) = inf
q1
sup
x1
E
f1∼q1
. . . inf
qT
sup
xT
E
fT∼qT
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))}
(2)
where qt and xt range over Q and X , respectively. With this definition of a value, the (deterministic) strategy
of the adversary is a sequence of mappings (Q×F ×X )t−1 ×Q 7→ X for each t ∈ [T ].
Definition 3. The problem is said to be online learnable if
lim sup
T→∞
VT (`,ΦT ) = 0 .
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The value of the game is defined as an expected performance measure. As such, it yields “in probability”
statements. We define the value of the game using a high probability performance measure in Section 6. We
also discuss there how the high probability results lead to “almost sure” convergence.
2.1 Examples
A reader might wonder why we have defined the game in terms of abstract payoff transformation mappings.
It turns out that with this definition, various seemingly different frameworks become nothing but special
cases, as illustrated by the following examples.
Example 1 (External Regret Game). Let H = R and
• B(z1, . . . , zT ) = 1T
∑T
t=1 zt
• ΦT = {(φf , . . . , φf ) : f ∈ F and φf : F 7→ F is a constant mapping φf (g) = f ∀g ∈ F}
It is easy to see that Eq. (1) becomes
RT =
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)− inf
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(f, xt).
External regret is discussed in Section 5.1.1.
Example 2 (Φ-Regret). Let H = R and
• B(z1, . . . , zT ) = 1T
∑T
t=1 zt
• ΦT = {(φ, . . . , φ) : φ ∈ Φ} for some fixed family Φ of F 7→ F mappings.
It is easy to see that Eq. (1) becomes
RT =
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)− inf
φ∈Φ
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(φ(ft), xt).
This example covers a variety of notions such as external, internal, and swap regrets (see Section 5.1).
Example 3 (Blackwell’s Approachability). Let H a subset of a Banach space B, S ⊂ B be a closed convex
set, and
• B(z1, . . . , zT ) = infc∈S
∥∥∥ 1T ∑Tt=1 zt − c∥∥∥
• ΦT contains sequences (φ1, . . . , φT ) such that `φt(f, x) = ct ∈ S for all f ∈ F , x ∈ X , and 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
It is easy to see that Eq. (1) becomes
RT = inf
c∈S
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)− c
∥∥∥∥∥ ,
the distance to the set S. Indeed, our definition of ΦT ensures that the comparator term is zero. Blackwell’s
approachability is discussed in Section 5.2.
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Example 4 (Calibration of Forecasters). Let H = Rk, F = ∆(k) (the k-dimensional probability simplex)
and X the set of standard unit vectors in Rk (vertices of ∆(k)). Define `(f, x) = 0. Further,
• B(z1, . . . , zT ) = −
∥∥∥ 1T ∑Tt=1 zt∥∥∥ for some norm ‖ · ‖ on Rk
• ΦT = {(φp,λ, . . . , φp,λ) : p ∈ ∆(k), λ > 0} contains time-invariant mappings defined by
`φp,λ(f, x) = 1 {‖f − p‖ ≤ λ} · (f − x).
It is easy to see that Eq. (1) becomes
RT = sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
1 {‖ft − p‖ ≤ λ} · (ft − xt)
∥∥∥∥∥ .
Calibration is discussed in more detail in Section 5.3.
Example 5 (Global Cost Online Learning Game [10]). Let H = Rk, X = [0, 1]k, F = ∆(k), `(f, x) =
f  x = (f1 · x1, . . . , fk · xk).
• B(z1, . . . , zT ) =
∥∥∥ 1T ∑Tt=1 zt∥∥∥
• ΦT = {(φf , . . . , φf ) : f ∈ F and φf : F 7→ F is a constant mapping φf (g) = f ∀g ∈ F}
It is easy to see that Eq. (1) becomes
RT =
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
ft  xt
∥∥∥∥∥− inff∈F
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
f  xt
∥∥∥∥∥ .
A generalization of this scenario is considered in Section 5.4.
2.2 Notation
Let Ex∼p denote expectation with respect to a random variable x with a distribution p. Note that we
do not use capital letters for random variables in order to ease reading of already cumbersome equations.
For a collection of random variables x1, . . . , xT with distributions p1, . . . , pT , we will use the shorthand
Ex1:T∼p1:T to denote expectation with respect to all these variables. Let q and p be distributions on F and
X , respectively. We define a shorthand `(q, p) = Ef∼q,x∼p`(f, x) and `φ(q, p) = Ef∼q,x∼p`φ(f, x). The Dirac
delta distribution is denoted by δx. A Rademacher random variable Y is uniformly distributed on {±1}.
The notation xa:b denotes the sequence xa, . . . , xb. The indicator of an event A is denoted by 1 {A}. The set
{1, . . . , T} is denoted by [T ], while the k-dimensional probability simplex is denoted by ∆(k). The set of all
functions from X to Y is denoted by YX , and the t-fold product X × . . .× X is denoted by X t. Whenever
a supremum (infimum) is written in the form supa without a being quantified, it is assumed that a ranges
over the set of all possible values which will be understood from the context. Convex hulls will be denoted
by conv(·).
Following [25], we define binary trees as follows.
Definition 4. Given some set Z, a Z-valued tree of depth T is a sequence (z1, . . . , zT ) of T mappings
zi : {±1}i−1 7→ Z. The root of the tree z is the constant function z1 ∈ Z.
6
Unless specified otherwise,  = (1, . . . , T ) ∈ {±1}T will define a path. Slightly abusing the notation, we
will write zt() instead of zt(1:t−1).
Let φid denote the identity payoff transformation `φid(f, x) = `(f, x) for all f ∈ F , x ∈ X . Let I =
{(φid, . . . , φid)} be the singleton set containing the time-invariant sequence of identity transformations.
For a separable Banach space B equipped with a norm ‖ · ‖, let B‖·‖ be the unit ball. Let B∗ denote the
dual space and B‖·‖∗ the corresponding dual ball. For a ∈ B∗, ‖a‖∗ = supb∈B‖·‖ | 〈a, b〉 |. For b ∈ B, we write
〈a, b〉 = a(b) for the continuous linear functional a ∈ B∗ on B. A Hilbert space is dual to itself.
3 General Upper Bounds
This section is devoted to upper bounds on the value of the game. We start by introducing the Triplex
Inequality, which requires no assumptions beyond those described in Section 2. Under the additional weak
assumption of subadditivity of B, we can perform symmetrization and further upper bound two of the three
terms in Triplex Inequality by a non-additive version of sequential Rademacher complexity [25]. As we
progress through the section, we make additional assumptions and specialize and refine the upper bounds.
The following definition generalizes the notion of sequential Rademacher complexity, introduced in [25], to
“global” functions B of the payoff sequence.
Definition 5. The sequential complexity with respect to the payoff function ` and payoff transformation
mappings ΦT is defined as
RT (`,ΦT ,B) = sup
f ,x
E1:T sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
1`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , T `φT (fT (),xT ())
)
where the outer supremum is taken over all (F×X )-valued trees of depth T and  = (1, . . . , T ) is a sequence
of i.i.d. Rademacher random variables.
Whenever B is clear from the context, it will be omitted from the notation: RT (`,ΦT ). If ΦT is a set of
sequences of time-invariant transformations obtained from the base class Φ, we will simply write RT (`,Φ).
Let us remark that the moves of the player and the adversary appear “on the same footing” in RT and
in the above definition of sequential complexity. The “asymmetry” of sequential Rademacher complexity
[25] (where the supremum is taken over the player’s best choice) arises precisely from the asymmetry of the
notion of external regret, which, in turn, is due to ΦT acting on the player choice only. In Section 5.1.1, we
show that the notion studied in [25] is indeed recovered for the case of external regret.
An equivalent way to write sequential complexity is through the expanded version
RT (`,ΦT ,B) = sup
f1,x1
E1 sup
f2,x2
E2 . . . sup
fT ,xT
ET sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
1`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , T `φT (fT , xT )
)
(3)
where the supremum on t-th step is over ft ∈ F , xt ∈ X . We shall use Eq. (3) and the more succinct
Definition 5 interchangeably.
3.1 Triplex Inequality
The following theorem is the main starting point for all further analysis. Because of its importance, we shall
refer to it as the Triplex Inequality. The three terms in the upper bound of the theorem can be thought of as
the three key players in the process of online learning: martingale convergence, the ability to perform well
if the future is known, and complexity of the class in terms of sequential complexity.
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Theorem 1 (Triplex Inequality). The following 3-term upper bound on the value of the game holds:
VT (`,ΦT )
≤ sup
p1,q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT ,qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
{
B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))− E
f ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
B(`(f ′1, x
′
1), . . . , `(f
′
T , x
′
T ))
}
(4)
+ sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
sup
φ∈ΦT
E
f1:T∼q1:T
x1:T∼p1:T
{
B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))
}
+ sup
p1,q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT ,qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
sup
φ∈ΦT
 Ef ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
B
(
`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1), . . . , `φT (f
′
T , x
′
T )
)
−B
(
`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT )
)
First, we remark that convexity of B is not required for the Triplex Inequality to hold. Under a weak
subadditivity condition, the following Theorem gives upper bounds on the first and the third term.
Theorem 2. If B is subadditive, then the last term in the Triplex Inequality is upper bounded by twice the
sequential complexity, 2RT (`,ΦT ,B), and the first term is bounded by 2RT (`, I,B) where I is the singleton
set consisting of the identity mapping. Similarly, if −B is subadditive, then the last term is upper bounded
by 2RT (`,ΦT ,−B) and the first term is bounded by 2RT (`, I,−B).
Discussion of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
• First, let us mention that Triplex Inequality is not the only way to decompose the value of the game
into useful and interpretable terms. In fact, slightly different decompositions yield better constants for
some of the examples in this paper. Nonetheless, the Triplex Inequality seems to capture the essence
of all the problems we considered and allows us to give a unified treatment to all of them.
• We note that the first and the third terms are similar in their form. In fact, the first term can be
equivalently written as
sup
p1,q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT ,qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
sup
φ∈I
B
(
`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT )
)
− E
f ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
B
(
`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1), . . . , `φT (f
′
T , x
′
T )
)
where I only contains the identity mapping. If I ⊆ ΦT , then, trivially, RT (`, I,B) ≤ RT (`,ΦT ,B)
and, therefore, an upper bound on the third term yields and upper bound on the first. However, in
some situations ΦT is “simpler” or incomparable to I and, hence, the first and the third term in the
Triplex Inequality are distinct.
• What exactly is achieved by Theorem 2? Let us compare the third term in the Triplex Inequality to its
sequential complexity upper bound given by Eq. (3). Both quantities involve interleaved suprema and
expected values. However, in the former, the suprema are over the choice of distributions pt, qt and
the expected values are draws of xt, ft from these mixed strategies. In contrast, sequential complexity,
as written in Eq. (3), contains suprema over the choices xt, ft followed by a random draw of the next
sign t. Crucially, it is easier to work with the sequential complexity as opposed to the third term
in the Triplex Inequality since in the former the only randomness comes from the random signs. In
mathematical terms, the σ-algebra is generated by {t} rather than a complicated stochastic process
arising from the Triplex Inequality. This is one of the key observations of the paper.
• Depending on a particular problem, some of the terms in the Triplex Inequality might be easier to
control than others. However, it is often the case that the first term is the easiest, as it naturally
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leads to the question of martingale convergence. The second term is typically bounded by providing a
specific response strategy for the player if the mixed strategy of the adversary is known. This response
strategy is similar to the so-called Blackwell’s condition for approachability (see Section 5.2 for further
comparison). The third term is arguably the most difficult as it captures complexity of the set of payoff
transformations ΦT . Under the subadditivity assumption on B, Theorem 2 upper bounds the first and
third terms by the sequential complexity.
• We remark that the first and third terms in Triplex Inequality contain suprema over the player’s
strategies qt instead of infima as in the definition of the value of the game. The proof of Theorem 1
points out the step where this over-bounding is done. While this might appear as a loose step, in
all the examples we considered, this still yields the needed results. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the
proof, one can substitute a particular strategy q∗t for the first and third terms instead of passing to the
supremum. For instance, q∗t can be the strategy which makes the second term in the Triplex Inequality
small. To simplify the presentation, we decided not to include such analysis.
• The following observation gives us a simple condition under which we can replace B with some other
B′, and we shall find it useful in scenarios when it is difficult to directly deal with B. If B : HT 7→ R
and B′ : HT 7→ R are such that ∀z1, . . . , zT ∈ H, B(z1, . . . , zT ) ≤ B′(z1, . . . , zT ) then we have that for
any class of transformations ΦT ,
RT (`,ΦT ,B) ≤ RT (`,ΦT ,B′) . (5)
• Finally, let us mention that we could have defined the performance measure in (1) as
RT = sup
(φ′,φ)∈(Φ′T×ΦT )
B(`φ′1(f1, x1), . . . , `φ′T (fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT )) . (6)
Clearly, (1) can be expressed as an instance of (6) by setting Φ′T = I. Conversely, if B is, for instance,
an average of its coordinates, we can view definition (6) as a particular case of (1). Indeed, given
a payoff ` and sets Φ′T ,ΦT of transformations, define a new payoff ¯`(f, x) = 0 and ¯`(φ′t,φt)(f, x) =−(`φ′t(f, x) − `φt(f, x)). Then (1) becomes exactly (6). While the analysis presented in this paper
can be extended for (6), in the examples we consider, the definition (1) of performance measure is
expressive enough.
We now detail upper bounds on this complexity under the smoothness assumption on B. The smoothness
assumption covers many important cases, such as norms.
3.2 General Bounds for Smooth B
As shown by Pisier [24] and Pinelis [23], existence of a smooth norm in a Banach spaces is crucial in the study
of exponential inequalities for martingales. Using similar techniques, we show that a smooth function B
will admit upper bounds in terms of certain increments. This will yield general tools for studying sequential
complexity for smooth functions B. Informally, the smoothness assumption provides a link from a “global”
function of coordinates to a sum of its parts. From the point of view of online learning, this is very promising,
as it appears to be difficult to sequentially optimize a “global” function of many decisions.
Consider the following definition of smoothness.
Definition 6. Function G : H 7→ R is said to be (σ, p)-uniformly smooth on H for some p ∈ (1, 2] and σ ≥ 0
if, for all z, z′ ∈ H, we have,
G(z) ≤ G(z′) + 〈∇G(z′), z − z′〉+ σ
p
‖z − z′‖p
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We say that G is uniformly smooth if there exist finite σ and p such that G is (σ, p)-uniformly smooth. We
say that the space (B, ‖ · ‖) is (γ, p)-smooth when the function ‖ · ‖p/p is (γ, p)-uniformly smooth.
A function which is smooth in its arguments can be “sequentially linearized”, with additional second-order
terms as norms of the increments. We establish the following upper bound on the first term of the Triplex
Inequality.
Lemma 3. Suppose B is subadditive and for some q ≥ 1, Bq is (σ, p)-uniformly smooth in each of its
arguments. Suppose B(0, . . . , 0) = 0 and that for any x ∈ X and f ∈ F it is true that ‖`(f, x)‖ ≤ η. Then
the first term in the Triplex Inequality is bounded by ((2η)pσT/p)
1/q
.
Under the assumptions of Lemma 3, we can also provide an upper bound on the third term. Lemma 4 below
says that the sequential complexity defined through a smooth function B can be upper bounded by the
sequential complexity involving a sum of first-order expansions of B.
Lemma 4. Assume that for some q ≥ 1, Bq is (σ, p)-uniformly smooth in each of its arguments, B(0, . . . , 0) =
0 and that for any x ∈ X , f ∈ F , φ ∈ ΦT and t ∈ [T ], it is true that ‖`φt(f, x)‖ ≤ η, then we have that
RT (`,ΦT ) ≤
(
sup
f ,x
E1:T sup
φ∈ΦT
T∑
t=1
tgt
(
`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , `φt(ft(),xt())
))1/q
+ (σηp/p)1/qT 1/q
where
gt
(
`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , `φt(ft(),xt())
)
=
〈∇tBq(1`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , t−1`φt−1(ft−1(),xt−1()), 0, . . . , 0), `φt(ft(),xt())〉 .
By taking gradients at successive time steps, we reduced the study of a global function B to the study of
its gradients. A reader familiar with [25] will notice that the first term of Lemma 4 (under the power of
1/q) resembles sequential Rademacher complexity. The first step in studying this term is to ask what can
be done with a finite class ΦT . To approach this question, we state a lemma from [25].
Lemma 5. [25] For any finite set V of R-valued trees of depth T we have that
E
[
max
v∈V
T∑
t=1
tvt()
]
≤
√√√√2 log(|V |) max
v∈V
max
∈{±1}T
T∑
t=1
vt()2 .
The above Lemma can be used to show the following result for any finite set of transformations ΦT .
Proposition 6. For any finite set of payoff transformations ΦT , under the conditions of Lemma 4 and
assuming ∥∥∇tBq(1`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , t−1`φt−1(ft−1(),xt−1()), 0, . . . , 0)∥∥ ≤ R
then
RT (`,ΦT ) ≤
(
2η2R2 log(|ΦT |)T
)1/2q
+ (σηp/p)1/qT 1/q .
Hence, if ΦT is finite, sequential complexity is bounded whenever B is smooth and the gradients of B are
bounded by R. Typically, R is of the order O(1/T ) if B is appropriately normalized to account for T (for
instance, if B is an average of its coordinates). Similarly, σ is either zero or o(1) for the examples considered
in this paper. With the appropriate behavior of the online covering number, the bound yields learnability
according to Definition 3.
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3.3 When B is a Function of the Average
For the rest of this sub-section we consider B of a particular form. We assume that,
B(z1, . . . , zT ) = G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
zt
)
,
where some power of G is (γ, p)-smooth function on the convex set conv(H) for some 1 < p ≤ 2. This form of
B occurs naturally in many games including Blackwell’s approachability and calibration. Among the most
basic smooth functions are powers of norms, as the next example shows.
Example 6. Consider B of the form
B(z1, . . . , zT ) =
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
zt
∥∥∥∥∥
q
.
The three cases q ∈ (1,∞), q = 1, and q =∞ are considered separately. Here G = ‖·‖q and we are interested
in checking if Gs is uniformly smooth for some power s.
I q ∈ (1,∞) For any q ∈ (1, 2], Gq(z) = ‖z‖qq is (q, q)-uniformly smooth and for any q ∈ [2,∞) the
function G2(z) = ‖z‖2q is (2(q − 1), 2)-uniformly smooth.
I q =∞ Unfortunately, for no finite power s is Gs uniformly smooth. However, for any z ∈ H and
any q′ ∈ (1,∞), ‖z‖∞ ≤ ‖z‖q′ . Hence we can use (5) and upper bound the sequential complexity
RT (`,ΦT ,B) ≤ RT (`,ΦT ,B′)
where B′(z1, . . . , zT ) =
∥∥∥ 1T ∑Tt=1 zt∥∥∥
q′
. By choosing q′ appropriately and using the smoothness of the
Lq′ norm (previous case) we can provide upper bounds for the value of the game.
I q = 1 As in the previous example, for no finite power s is Gs uniformly smooth. However if H ⊆ Rd,
then for any z ∈ H and any q′ ∈ (1,∞), ‖z‖1 ≤ Cq′,d‖z‖q′ where Cq′,d is a constant dependent on q′
and dimension of the space d. Again we can use (5) and upper bound
RT (`,ΦT ,B) ≤ RT (`,ΦT ,B′)
where B′(z1, . . . , zT ) =
∥∥∥ 1T ∑Tt=1 zt∥∥∥
q′
. Choosing q′ appropriately and using the smoothness of the Lq′
norm we can provide upper bounds for the value of the game.
For a concrete example of a smooth norm, we refer to the calibration example of Section 5.3. We now
specialize the statement of Proposition 6 to the specific assumption on B.
Corollary 7. Let ΦT be a finite set of payoff transformations. Assume that for some q ≥ 1, Gq is (γ, p)-
smooth function for some 1 < p ≤ 2. Also assume that ‖∇Gq (z)‖∗ ≤ ρ for any z ∈ conv(H). Further,
suppose that for any x ∈ X , f ∈ F , φ ∈ ΦT and t ∈ [T ], it is true that ‖`φt(f, x)‖ ≤ η. Then it holds that
RT (`,ΦT ) ≤
(
2η2 log(|ΦT |)
T
)1/2q
+ (γηp/p)1/qT (1−p)/q .
The above result is a direct corollary of the more general Proposition 6 in the case where B is a function of
the average. It turns out that we do not always get the best convergence rate in this manner. The following
result shows that if G is 1-Lipschitz and G2 is 2-smooth, we should obtain a O(1/
√
T ) convergence rate.
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Lemma 8. Let ΦT be a finite set of payoff transformations. Assume that B(z1, . . . , zT ) = G
(
1
T
∑T
t=1 zt
)
where G ≥ 0 is 1-Lipschitz with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖, G(0) = 0 and G2 is (γ, 2)-smooth function. Further,
suppose that for any x ∈ X , f ∈ F , φ ∈ ΦT and t ∈ [T ], it is true that ‖`φt(f, x)‖ ≤ η. Then, for
T ≥ log(2|ΦT |)/γ, it holds that
RT (`,ΦT ) ≤ 2
√
γη2 log(2|ΦT |)
T
The next result generalizes the above lemma to the case when the exponent of smoothness is different from
2. Because of a different proof strategy, there are two differences between the next lemma and the previous
one. First, instead of assuming smoothness of some power of G, we instead assume that the space (B, ‖ · ‖)
is (γ, p)-smooth. Second, we get extra log(T ) factors that are probably an artifact of our analysis.
Lemma 9. Let ΦT be a finite set of payoff transformations with |ΦT | > 1. Assume that B(z1, . . . , zT ) =
G
(
1
T
∑T
t=1 zt
)
where G ≥ 0 is 1-Lipschitz with respect to a norm ‖ · ‖ and G(0) = 0. Suppose that (B, ‖ · ‖)
is a (γ, p)-smooth space. Further, suppose that for any x ∈ X , f ∈ F , φ ∈ ΦT and t ∈ [T ], it is true that
‖`φt(f, x)‖ ≤ η. Then, for any T ≥ 3, it holds that
RT (`,ΦT ) ≤ 4 c γ
1/p log3/2 T
T 1−1/p
√
η2 log(2|ΦT |)
for some absolute constant c.
Having a bound on the complexity of a finite set of payoff transformations, we seek to extend the results to
infinite sets. A natural approach is to pass to a finite cover of the set at an expense of losing an amount
proportional to the resolution of the cover. Before proceeding, however, we need to define an appropriate
notion of a cover. The following definition can be seen as a generalization of the corresponding notion
introduced in [25]. We remark that the object, for which we would like to provide a cover, is the set ΦT
of payoff transformations. Whenever payoff transformations are simply constant time-invariant departure
mappings, complexity of ΦT identical to that of F , yielding the online cover of class F (see Section 5.1.1 for
more details). In general, however, the set of payoff transformations can be much more complex than (or
not even comparable to) F .
Definition 7. A set V of H-valued trees of depth T is an α-cover (with respect to `p-norm) of ΦT on an
(F × X )-valued tree (f ,x) of depth T if
∀φ ∈ ΦT , ∀ ∈ {±1}T ∃v ∈ V s.t.
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
‖vt()− `φt(ft(),xt())‖p
)1/p
≤ α (7)
The covering number of the set of payoff transformations ΦT on a given tree (f ,x) is defined as
Np(α,ΦT , (f ,x)) = min{|V | : V is an α− cover w.r.t. `p-norm of ΦT on (f ,x) tree}.
Further define Np(α,ΦT , T ) = sup(f ,x)Np(α,ΦT , (f ,x)), the maximal `p covering number of ΦT over depth
T trees.
This definition of the cover is indeed the most general for the setting we consider in this paper. In sections
that follow, we specialize this definition to fit particular assumptions on ΦT .
We now give generalizations Dudley’s bound for the case when B is a function of the average.
Theorem 10. Assume that B(z1, . . . , zT ) = G
(
1
T
∑T
t=1 zt
)
where G ≥ 0 is sub-additive, 1-Lipschitz with
respect to a norm ‖ · ‖, G(0) = 0 and G2 is (γ, 2)-smooth. Further, suppose that for any x ∈ X , f ∈ F ,
φ ∈ ΦT and t ∈ [T ], it is true that ‖`φt(f, x)‖ ≤ 1. Then it holds that
RT (`,ΦT ) ≤ 4 inf
α>0
{
α+ 6
√
γ
T
∫ 1
α
√
logN∞(β,ΦT , T )dβ
}
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3.4 General Bounds Under Linearity Assumptions on B
The general results of the previous section can be restated in simpler terms once more assumptions are made.
In particular, some of the terms in the three-term decomposition in Theorem 1 can be dropped as soon asB is
linear. While some of the results below can be repeated for a more general formB(z1, . . . , zT ) =
∑T
t=1 〈ct, zt〉
(for some c1, . . . , cT ∈ B∗ and H ⊆ B), for simplicity we assume that B is an average of its arguments and
that H ⊆ R:
B(z1, . . . , zT ) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
zt .
Of course, such B is trivially smooth (with σ = 0), so all the results of the previous section apply.
Corollary 11. The following statements hold:
• The first term in the Triplex Inequality is zero.
• If ΦT is a class of departure mappings, then the second term in the Triplex Inequality is non-positive.
In this case,
VT (`,ΦT ) ≤ 2RT (`,ΦT ).
• Let H ⊆ [−1, 1]. We have,
RT (`,ΦT ) ≤ 4 inf
α≥0
{
α+ 6
√
2
∫ 1
α
√
logN∞(δ,ΦT , T )
T
dδ
}
.
Note that the use of `∞ covering numbers in the above result is not essential. In the case H ⊆ [−1, 1], we
can use `2 covering numbers by adapting the proof of Theorem 9 in [25].
When B is the average of its coordinates, the sequential complexity takes on a familiar form:
RT (`,ΦT ) = sup
f ,x
E1:T sup
φ∈ΦT
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt()).
Further, for H ⊆ R, Eq. (7) in definition of the cover becomes
∀φ ∈ ΦT , ∀ ∈ {±1}T ∃v ∈ V s.t.
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
|vt()− `φt(ft(),xt())|p
)1/p
≤ α
where V is now a set of R-valued trees.
A further simplification of various notions is obtained for time-invariant payoff transformations. Moreover, for
time-invariant payoff transformations we can define combinatorial parameters, generalizing the Littlestone’s
[21, 3] and fat-shattering dimensions [25]. This is the subject of the next section.
3.4.1 Combinatorial Parameters for Time-Invariant Payoff Transformations
Assume H ⊆ R. Consider time-invariant payoff transformations generated from some base class of payoff
transformations Φ (see Definition 2). That is, ΦT = {(φ, . . . , φ) : φ ∈ Φ}. We have the following definition
of a generalized shattering dimension.
Definition 8. Let H = {±1}. An (F × X )-valued tree (f ,x) of depth d is shattered2 by a payoff transfor-
mation class Φ if for all  ∈ {±1}d, there exists φ ∈ Φ such that `φ(ft(),xt()) = t for all t ∈ [d]. The
shattering dimension Sdim(Φ) is the largest d such that Φ shatters an (F × X )-valued tree of depth d.
2As a historical aside, the term “shattered set” was introduced by J. Michael Steele in his Ph.D. thesis in 1975.
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We can also define the scale-sensitive version of the shattering dimension, generalizing the fat-shattering
dimension of [25].
Definition 9. An (F × X )-valued tree (f ,x) of depth d is α-shattered by a payoff transformation class Φ,
if there exists an R-valued tree s of depth d such that
∀ ∈ {±1}d, ∃φ ∈ Φ s.t. ∀t ∈ [d], t
(
`φ(ft(),xt())− st()
)
≥ α/2
The tree s is called the witness to shattering. The fat-shattering dimension fatα(Φ) at scale α is the largest
d such that Φ α-shatters an (F × X )-valued tree of depth d.
Slightly abusing notation, we write Np(α,Φ, (f ,x)) instead of Np(α,ΦT , (f ,x)) whenever ΦT consists of
sequences of time-invariant payoff transformations with a base class Φ.
The combinatorial parameters are useful if they can be shown to control problem complexity through, for
instance, covering numbers. We state the following three results without proofs, as the arguments are
identical to the ones given in [25]. To be precise, the (f ,x) tree here plays the role of the x tree in [25], `φ
for φ ∈ Φ plays the role of f ∈ F in [25].
Theorem 12. Let H ⊆ {0, . . . , k} and fat2(Φ) = d. Then
N∞(1/2,Φ, T ) ≤
d∑
i=0
(
T
i
)
ki ≤ (ekT )d .
Furthermore, for T ≥ d
d∑
i=0
(
T
i
)
ki ≤
(
ekT
d
)d
.
We now show that the covering numbers are bounded in terms of the fat-shattering dimension.
Corollary 13. Suppose H ⊆ [−1, 1]. Then for any α > 0, any T > 0, and any (F ×X )-valued tree (f ,x) of
depth T ,
N1(α,Φ, (f ,x)) ≤ N2(α,Φ, (f ,x)) ≤ N∞(α,Φ, (f ,x)) ≤
(
2eT
α
)fatα(Φ)
Theorem 14. Let H ⊆ {0, . . . , k} and fat1(Φ) = d. Then
N (0,Φ, T ) ≤
d∑
i=0
(
T
i
)
ki ≤ (ekT )d .
Furthermore, for T ≥ d
d∑
i=0
(
T
i
)
ki ≤
(
ekT
d
)d
.
In particular, the result holds for binary-valued function classes (k = 1), in which case fat1(Φ) = Sdim(Φ).
The generality of these results is evident, as both the combinatorial parameters and covering numbers are
defined for any performance measure (1) with time-invariant payoff transformations. In particular, this
includes Φ-regret (see Section 5.1).
14
3.5 General Bounds for Slowly-Varying Payoff Transformations
In Section 3.4.1, we assumed that the set ΦT of sequences of payoff transformations is time-invariant.
This assumption naturally leads to a control on the complexity of ΦT . Lifting the assumption of time-
invariance, we now go back to the level of generality of Proposition 6. We observe that size of ΦT or an
appropriately behaving covering number N2(α,ΦT , T ) is key for bounding the sequential complexity. If
payoff transformations change wildly in time, there is little hope of getting non-trivial bounds. The good
news is that, under some assumptions on the variability of the sequences in ΦT , we can get a bound on the
covering number of ΦT .
It has been shown in [18, 6] that it is possible to have small external regret against comparators that change
a limited number of times. This alleviates an obvious limitation of the classical notion of external regret,
viz., comparison to the fixed best decision. Another result of this flavor appears in [27], where dynamic
regret is defined with respect to a comparator whose path length is bounded. In general, one can consider
situations where we would like to compete with a budgeted comparator. We now show that the assumptions
of slowly-varying or budgeted comparators are naturally captured by our framework through the notion of
slowly-changing payoff transformations ΦT . Furthermore, the control of covering numbers of ΦT becomes
transparent under such assumptions. Our goal here is not to provide a comprehensive list of possible results,
but rather to show versatility of our framework.
3.5.1 Tracking the Best Transformation
Suppose Φ is a finite set of payoff transformations. Let ΦkT be obtained by considering all piecewise constant
sequences with k changes:
ΦkT = {(φ1, . . . , φT ) : 1 = i0 ≤ i1 ≤ . . . ≤ ik ≤ T and φt = φt′ if is ≤ t ≤ t′ < is+1 for some s ≥ 0}.
If cardinality |Φ| = N , it is easy to check that |ΦkT | ≤
(
T
k
) ·Nk+1. Under the assumptions of Proposition 6,
this immediately implies a bound of the order(
R2(k logN + k log T )T
)1/2q
+ σ1/qT 1/q .
It is natural to extend the above results by lifting the assumption that Φ is a finite set of payoff transfor-
mations. This can be done by considering an online cover Np(`,Φ, α) of Φ in some `p norm along with the
same definition of ΦkT . Next we do this in an even more general setting.
3.5.2 Slowly Changing Transformations
To start, suppose ΦT consists of payoff transformations (φ1, . . . , φT ) which are “almost” time-invariant within
each of k + 1 intervals. Consider the following definition:
Φk,αT =
{
(φ1, . . . , φT ) : 1 = i0 ≤ i1 ≤ . . . ≤ ik ≤ T
and sup
f,x
‖`φt(f, x)− `φt′ (f, x)‖ ≤ α if is ≤ t ≤ t′ < is+1 for some s ≥ 0
}
.
One can think of the time-invariant segments as “accumulation points” where the payoff transformations do
not vary much.
Suppose that we have a finite cover V of Φ at scale α, of cardinality |V | = N∞(α,Φ, T ). The L∞ covering is
chosen for the purposes of simplicity, though tighter (and more difficult) results are expected from directly
studying L2 covering numbers.
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Lemma 15. If N∞(α,Φ, T ) is finite,
N∞(2α,Φk,αT , T ) ≤
(
T
k
)
· N∞(α,Φ, T )k+1 .
Further extending the above results, we will now study the size of an online cover if ΦT consists of payoff
transformations of bounded length. In general, “length” can be defined as some budget given by the setting
at hand. Here, we present a straightforward approach without an attempt to give very general and tight
bounds.
Suppose that ΦT is a set of sequences (φ1, . . . , φT ) of payoff transformations which do not “vary much”,
according to the following definition. The length of a sequence (φ1, . . . , φT ) of payoff transformations (with
respect to L∞ distance) is defined as
len(φ1, . . . , φT ) :=
T−1∑
t=1
sup
f,x
∥∥`φt(f, x)− `φt+1(f, x)∥∥ .
Again, we consider the L∞ distance between payoffs (as functions over F×X ). Assume that for all sequences
in ΦT , their length is bounded by some L > 0. We will now claim that by choosing k large enough, the
set of covering trees V k defined in the proof of Lemma 15 provides a cover for ΦT at a given scale α > 0.
Consider any (φ1, . . . , φT ) ∈ ΦT . We construct the nondecreasing sequence i1, . . . , ij , . . . ∈ {1, . . . , T} of
“change-points” as follows: increase t until the next payoff transformation is farther than α from the payoff
transformation at ij :
ij+1 = inf
t>ij
{
sup
f,x
∥∥∥`φij (f, x)− `φt(f, x)∥∥∥ ≥ α
}
Let k be the length of the largest such sequence for all elements of ΦT . We have simply reduced the problem
to the one studied in the previous section: within each block, all the payoff transformations are close.
Clearly, k = k(α) ≤ L/α, but can potentially be smaller under additional assumptions on ΦT . We then have
a bound on the size of a 2α-cover of ΦT :
N∞(2α,ΦT , T ) ≤
(
T
k(α)
)
· N∞(α,Φ, T )k(α)+1 ≤
(
T
L/α
)
· N∞(α,Φ, T )L/α+1,
and
logN∞(2α,ΦT , T ) ≤ O
(
L
α
log T +
L
α
logN∞(α,Φ, T )
)
.
The covering number can be now used, for example in Theorem 10, to control sequential complexity when
B is a function of the average. We note that it is possible to derive analogous Dudley’s integral type bound
solely under smoothness assumptions on B.
4 Techniques for Lower Bounds
It is well-known that an equalizing strategy (i.e. a strategy that makes the move of the other player “irrel-
evant”) can often be shown to be minimax optimal. In this section, we define a notion of an equalizer for
our repeated game and show that it can be used to prove lower bounds on the value of the game. While
existence of an equalizer has to be established for particular problems at hand, the lower bounds below hold
whenever such an equalizer exists.
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Definition 10. A strategy {p∗t } for the adversary is said to be an equalizer strategy if
E
x1∼p∗1
f1∼q∗1
. . . E
xT∼p∗T
fT∼q∗T
RT ((f1, x1), . . . , (fT , xT )) = E
x1∼p∗1
f1∼q∗1
. . . E
xT∼p∗T
fT∼q∗T
RT ((f1, x1), . . . , (fT , xT ))
for all strategies {q∗t } and
{
q∗t
}
of the player. Here RT is defined as in (1).
Using the above definition of an equalizer we have the following proposition as an immediate consequence.
Proposition 16. For any Equalizer strategy {p∗t } we have that for any f ∈ F ,
VT (`,ΦT ) ≥ E
x1∼p1
. . . E
xT∼pT
[
B (`(f, x1), . . . , `(f, xT ))− inf
φ∈ΦT
B (`φ1(f, x1), . . . , `φT (f, xT ))
]
where pt = p
∗
t
(
{fs = f, xs}t−1s=1
)
Remark 1. For many interesting games we consider it is often the case that for any x1, . . . , xT and any
f1, . . . , fT , f
′
1, . . . , f
′
T ,
inf
φ∈ΦT
B (`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT )) = inf
φ∈ΦT
B (`φ1(f
′
1, x1), . . . , `φT (f
′
T , xT ))
In these cases since the player’s actions do not even affect the second term of the regret, to check if a strategy
{p∗t } is an equalizer or not we only need to check if
E
x1∼p∗1
f1∼q∗1
. . . E
xT∼p∗T
fT∼q∗T
B (`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT )) = E
x1∼p∗1
f1∼q∗1
. . . E
xT∼p∗T
fT∼q∗T
B (`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))
for all strategies {q∗t } and {q∗t } of the player.
Interestingly enough, many of the existing lower bounds in online learning literature are, in fact, equalizers
(see e.g. [8, p. 252]). In particular, in [1], a lower bound on the value of the game was derived by looking at a
certain face of a convex hull of loss vectors. The face, supported by a probability distribution p, corresponds
to the set of functions with the same expected loss under the distribution p. Hence, p is an equalizing
strategy for those functions. Since these functions are the “best” with respect to this distribution, a lower
bound in terms of complexity of this set was derived in [1]. Furthermore, [19] shows that a lower bound on
the rate of convergence in the i.i.d. setting is achieved when there are two distinct minimizers of expected
error for a given distribution. Again, this distribution can be viewed as an equalizer for the non-singleton
set of minimizers of expected error.
5 Examples and Comparison to Known Results
We now turn to several specific settings studied in the literature and look at them through the prism of
our general results. While we believe that online learnability in many different scenarios can be established
through our framework, we decided to focus on several major problems. On the surface, these problems are
quite different; yet, through our unified approach we show that learnability can be seamlessly established for
all of them. The unification not only leads to simpler proofs and sharper results, but also yields insight into
the inherent complexity and ways of making more comprehensive statements.
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5.1 Φ-Regret
In this section, we consider a particular notion of performance measure, known as Φ-regret [26, 15, 16]. In
our framework, this means that we restrict ourselves to only time-invariant departure mapping classes ΦT
specified by a base class Φ of mappings from F to itself (see Definitions 1 and 2). The particular choices of
Φ lead to various notions, such as external, internal, swap regret, and more.
To define Φ-regret (Example 2), we fix a set Φ of departure mappings which map F to F and define the
set of time-invariant departure mappings ΦT := {(φ, . . . , φ) : φ ∈ Φ}. Then the measure of performance
becomes Φ-regret:
RT =
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)− inf
φ∈Φ
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(φ(ft), xt),
where H ⊆ R. Since B is the average of its arguments, Corollary 11 implies
Corollary 17. In the setting of Φ-regret,
VT (`,Φ) ≤ 2R(`,Φ) .
Specializing the definition of sequential complexity to Φ-regret, we obtain the following definition.
Definition 11. The sequential complexity for Φ-regret is defined as
RT (`,Φ) = sup
(f ,x)
E1:T sup
φ∈Φ
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`(φ ◦ ft(),xt()) (8)
where, as before, the first supremum is over F × X -valued trees (f ,x) of depth T .
The following property allows us to immediately obtain bounds for convex hulls of finite sets Φ.
Proposition 18. Suppose ` is convex in the first argument and conv(Φ) maps F into F . Then
RT (`, conv(Φ)) = RT (`,Φ) .
We also have the following version of the contraction lemma, whose proof is identical to that given in [25].
Lemma 19. Fix a function ψ : R × F × X 7→ R such that for any f ∈ F , x ∈ X , ψ(·, f, x) is a Lipschitz
function with a constant L. Then
R(ψ ◦ `,Φ) ≤ L ·R(`,Φ)
where ψ ◦ ` is defined by the mapping (f, x) 7→ ψ(`(f, x), f, x) for all f ∈ F , x ∈ X .
Next, we specialize Definition 7 to the particular case of Φ-regret.
Definition 12. A set V of R-valued trees of depth T is an α-cover (with respect to `p-norm) of ΦT on the
F × X -valued tree (f ,x) of depth T if
∀φ ∈ Φ, ∀ ∈ {±1}T ∃v ∈ V s.t.
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
|vt()− `(φ ◦ ft(),xt())|p
)1/p
≤ α
The covering number of ΦT on a given tree (f ,x) is defined as the size of the minimum cover, as in Definition 7.
We now turn to particular examples to utilize the results and definitions stated above.
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5.1.1 External Regret
External regret is the simplest example of Φ-regret. We separate it from the general discussion in order to
show that for external regret the various notions introduced in this paper reduce to the ones proposed in
[25].
Considering the definitions in Example 1, notice that the time-invariant departure mappings class ΦT is
chosen to be the class of sequences of constant mappings {(φf , . . . , φf ) : f ∈ F and φf (g) = f ∀g ∈ F}.
It is precisely because of this constancy of φ that the dependence on the F-valued tree f disappears from
all the definitions and results. Further, because of the obvious bijection between elements of ΦT and F ,
minimization (maximization) over ΦT can be written as minimization (maximization) over F . Notice that
the action of φf on the payoff is `φf (ft, xt) = `(f, xt).
Let us turn to Definition 11 of the sequential complexity for Φ-regret. Because each φf ∈ Φ is a constant
mapping, we have
RT (`,Φ) = sup
f ,x
E1:T sup
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`(f,xt())
= sup
x
E1:T sup
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`(f,xt()). (9)
If payoff is written as `(f, x) = f(x), this is precisely the sequential Rademacher complexity defined in [25].
Next, we show that Definition 12 reduces to the definition of online covering given in [25]. Indeed, `φf (ft(),xt()) =
`(f,xt()) for the constant mappings φ = (φf , . . . , φf ). Further, the payoff space H ⊆ R. With these sim-
plifications, the closeness to a covering element in Definition 12 becomes
∀f ∈ F , ∀ ∈ {±1}T ∃v ∈ V s.t.
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
|vt()− `(f,xt())|p
)1/p
≤ α
where V is a set of R-valued trees. It is then immediate that Corollary 11 recovers the corresponding result
of [25]. For a detailed study of external regret, we refer the reader to the companion paper [25].
Lower Bounds in the Supervised Setting We provide a lower bound for external regret in the super-
vised learning setting using the notion of an equalizer (see Section 4). To this end, we assume that X = Z×Y
where Z is the space of predictors and Y is the space of responses (outcomes). The setting is called supervised
because, in the machine learning terminology, the observed data is thought of as examples together with
labels. Assume F is a class of bounded real-valued functions and the space of outcomes is a bounded interval;
for simplicity let F ⊆ [−1, 1]Z and Y = [−1, 1]. Suppose the loss is of the form `(f, (z, y)) = |f(z)− y|.
Proposition 20. The value of the supervised game defined above is lower bounded by sequential Rademacher
complexity:
VST (`,ΦT ) ≥ RT (`,Φ)
Proof. Recall that we have a fixed set Φ of constant departure mappings. We will now exhibit an equalizer
strategy. Following Remark 1, observe that for any (z1, y1), . . . , (zT , yT ) and any f1, . . . , fT , f
′
1, . . . , f
′
T ,
inf
φ∈Φ
1
T
T∑
t=1
|(φ ◦ ft)(zt)− yt| = inf
φ∈Φ
1
T
T∑
t=1
|(φ ◦ f ′t)(zt)− yt|
because any φ ∈ Φ is a constant mapping. Thus, for a strategy to be an equalizer, it only needs to “equalize”
the cumulative loss of the player. Here is how we construct such a strategy. Let py be defined as the
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distribution of a Rademacher ±1 random variable Y ; this will define the labels yt as independent coin flips.
Now, fix any Z-valued tree z of depth T . Let {p∗t } be a strategy defined by p∗t (y1:t−1) = δzt(y1:t−1) × py,
a delta distribution on zt(y1:t−1) defined by the tree z and py on Y. In plain words, the strategy of the
adversary for each t is to choose a particular zt ∈ Z given the labels y1, . . . , yt−1, and let the label be an
independent Rademacher random variable.
By Remark 1, it is enough to check
E
(z1,y1)∼p∗1
f1∼q∗1
. . . E
(zT ,yT )∼p∗T
fT∼q∗T
1
T
T∑
t=1
|ft(zt)− yt| = E
(z1,y1)∼p∗1
f1∼q∗1
. . . E
(zT ,yT )∼p∗T
fT∼q∗T
1
T
T∑
t=1
|ft(zt)− yt|
for all strategies {q∗t } and {q∗t } of the player. This equality is indeed true because E
yt∼py
|a − yt| = 1
independently of the constant a ∈ [−1, 1]. By Proposition 16, for any g ∈ F
VST (`,ΦT ) ≥ E
(z1,y1)∼p∗1
. . . E
(zT ,yT )∼p∗T
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
|g(zt)− yt| − inf
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
|f(zt)− yt|
]
= E
y1,...,yT
[
1− inf
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
|f(zt(y1:t−1))− yt|
]
= E
y1,...,yT
[
sup
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
ytf(zt(y1:t−1))
]
where y1, . . . , yT are i.i.d. Rademacher random variables. Since the lower bound holds for any Z-valued tree
z of depth T , it also holds for the supremum:
VST (`,ΦT ) ≥ sup
z
E
y1,...,yT
[
sup
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
ytf(zt(y1:t−1))
]
= RT (`,Φ) .
Hence, the lower bound on the value of the supervised game is the sequential Rademacher complexity of
F .
Lower Bounds for Online Convex Optimization We first provide a lower bound for a linear game.
By Lemma 42, this lower bound will also serve as a lower bound for a convex Lipschitz game. We remark
that these lower bounds are not entirely new (see e.g. [1, 2]), and we derive them here for the purposes of
completeness, as well as to stress that they arise from an equalizing strategy.
Suppose F is a unit ball in some norm ‖ · ‖ and X is a unit ball in the dual norm ‖ · ‖∗. The loss
`(f, x) = x(f) = 〈f, x〉 and the set Φ is, again, a set of constant departure mappings.
Proposition 21. The value of the linear game defined above is lower bounded by sequential Rademacher
complexity:
VT (`,ΦT ) ≥ RT (`,Φ).
Hence, the value of the convex Lipschitz game (where X is the set of all 1-Lipschitz convex functions on F)
is also lower bounded by the same quantity.
Proof. Similarly to the proof for the supervised game, observe that for any x1, . . . , xT and any f1, . . . , fT , f
′
1, . . . , f
′
T ,
inf
φ∈Φ
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈φ(ft), xt〉 = inf
φ∈Φ
1
T
T∑
t=1
〈φ(f ′t), xt〉
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because any φ ∈ Φ is a constant mapping. Following Remark 1, we only need to exhibit a strategy that
equalizes the player’s loss. To this end, fix an X -valued tree x of depth T . Consider the adversary’s strategy
where at each step an t is chosen uniformly at random from {±1} and xt = t · x(1:t−1) ∈ X .
By Remark 1, it is enough to check
E
f1∼q∗1
E
1
. . . E
fT∼q∗T
E
T
1
T
T∑
t=1
t 〈ft,x(1:t−1)〉 = E
f1∼q∗1
E
1
. . . E
fT∼q∗T
E
T
1
T
T∑
t=1
t 〈ft,x(1:t−1)〉
for all strategies {q∗t } and {q∗t } of the player. This equality is indeed true because both terms are identically
zero. By Proposition 16, for any g ∈ F
VT (`,ΦT ) ≥ E
1,...,T
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
t 〈g,x(1:t−1)〉 − inf
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
t 〈f,x(1:t−1)〉
]
= E
1,...,T
sup
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
t 〈f,x(1:t−1)〉 .
Since this holds for any X -valued tree x, we have proven the statement.
5.1.2 Internal and Swap Regret
Assume the cardinality N = |F| is finite. For internal regret, Φ is the set of mappings {φf→g : φf→g(f) =
g and φf→g(h) = h ∀h 6= f, h ∈ F}. For swap regret [5, 8], Φ contains all NN functions from F to itself.
It is easy to see that the finite class lemma (Lemma 5) immediately recovers the O(
√
T logN) bound for
internal and external regret and the O(
√
TN logN) bound for the swap regret [8].
Our general tools, however, allow us to go well beyond finite sets of departure mappings. In the following
sections, we consider several examples of infinite classes of departure mappings which have been considered
in the literature. In some of these cases, an explicit strategy requires computation of a fixed-point [16, 15].
Since we are not providing efficient algorithms in order to obtain bounds, we are able to get sharp results
by directly focusing on the complexity of these infinite classes of departure mappings.
5.1.3 Convergence to Φ-correlated Equilibria
A beautiful result of Foster and Vohra [11] shows that convergence to the set of correlated equilibria can
be achieved if players follow internal regret minimization strategies. What is surprising, no coordination
is required to achieve this goal. Stoltz and Lugosi [26] extended this result to compact and convex sets of
strategies in normed spaces. In this section we show that their results can be improved in certain situations.
Let us consider their setting in a bit more detail. Suppose there are N players each playing in a strategy
set F . We could make the strategy set player dependent but it only complicates notation. There is N loss
functions mapping a strategy profile (f1, . . . , fN ) to {`k(f1, . . . , fN )}Nk=1, the losses for each of the N players.
Consider a set of departure mappings Φ ⊆ {φ : F → F}. A Φ-correlated equilibrim is a distribution pi over
strategy profiles such that if the player jointly play according to it, no player has an incentive to unilaterally
transform its action using a mapping from Φ. That is,
∀k ∈ [N ],∀φ ∈ Φ, E(f1,...,fN )∼pi [`k(fk, f−k)] ≤ E(f1,...,fN )∼pi [`k(φ(fk), f−k)] .
Theorem 18 in [26] shows the following. If F is convex compact subset of a normed vector space, `k’s are
continuous and Φ is a separable subset of C(F)3, then there exist regret minimizing algorithms such that,
3The set of continuous function on F equipped with the supremum norm
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if every player follows the algorithm then the sequence of empirical plays jointly converges to the set of
Φ-correlated equilibria.
Consider a particular player k. The regret minimizing algorithm for it is simply a Φ˜-regret minimizing
algorithm with `(f, x) = x(f) where we have identified the adversary set X with the class of functions
{f 7→ `k(f, g) : g ∈ Fk−1}, where g is a strategy profile over the remaining k − 1 players. Examining
Stoltz and Lugosi’s proof reveals that Φ˜ is taken to be a dense countable subset of Φ and an explicit regret
minimizing algorithm for countably infinite classes of departure mappings is used. The regret w.r.t. each
φ ∈ Φ does go to zero but the rate is not uniform in φ. In particular, it depends on the order in which the
class Φ˜ is enumerated. Later, they also consider examples of uncountable classes Φ of departure mapping
where non-asymptotic rates of convergence for Φ-regret can be obtained. Specifically, they use the metric
entropy of Φ. We show how to improve their bounds using sequential complexity.
As an example, consider the case where F is some compact subset of the unit ball in some normed space
with a norm ‖ ·‖, the loss function `k is a 1-Lipschitz convex function, and the class Φ of departure functions
has finite metric entropy Nmetric(Φ, α) for all α > 0. Metric entropy is simply the log covering number where
covers of Φ are built for the supremum norm ‖φ‖∞ = supf∈F ‖φ(f)‖. Let us consider a typical situation
where Nmetric(Φ, α) = Θ(1/αp). To upper bound the Φ-regret we can always make the set of adversary’s
moves larger. In fact, we make set X = CF , where
CF = {x : F → R : x convex and 1-Lipschitz} .
Moreover, by Lemma 42, we have VT (CF ,F ,Φ) = VT (LF ,F ,Φ) where
LF = {x : F → R : x linear and 1-Lipschitz} .
Then the sequential complexity bound is
sup
(f ,x)
E1:T sup
φ∈Φ
1
T
T∑
t=1
t 〈φ(ft()),xt()〉 . (10)
Note that the set X is now just the set of 1-Lipschitz linear functions, i.e. elements in the unit ball of the
dual space. Since ‖φ1 − φ2‖∞ ≤ α implies
|〈φ1(f), x〉 − 〈φ2(f), x〉| ≤ α
for any x ∈ X , we can use metric entropy inside Dudley’s integral to upper bound the sequential complexity
by
c inf
α
(
αT +
√
T
∫ 1
α′=α
√
1
α′p
dα′
)
.
This bound behaves as O(
√
T ), if p < 2, as O(
√
T log(T )) if p = 2, and as O(T (p−1)/p) if p > 2. These are
better than the general bound of O(T (p+1)/(p+2)) given in Example 23 of [26].
5.1.4 Linear Transformations
In this section we consider the following scenario, discussed in [15]. Suppose F is a subset of a Hilbert space
M. Let Φ be the set of Lipschitz linear transformations on F , i.e. Φ = {M ∈ F → F : ‖M‖ ≤ R} for some
operator norm ‖ · ‖. Let ‖ · ‖∗ be dual to ‖ · ‖. We are assuming the Online Convex Optimization scenario,
i.e. X is a set of L-Lipschitz real-valued convex functions on F and the loss is defined as `(f, x) = x(f).
Furthermore,
`φM (f, x) = x(Mf).
Therefore, we are in the setting of the well-studied online convex optimization (possibly in an infinite-
dimensional Hilbert space), yet instead of being compared to the value of the best fixed point f∗ in hindsight,
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the player is being evaluated according to the best linear transformation of his trajectory f1, . . . , fT . Is this
problem learnable?
By Lemma 42, the value of the convex game is equal to the value of the associated linear game. Suppose
functions x ∈ X have gradients bounded by L in the `2 norm. The value of the convex game is upper
bounded by the sequential complexity of the class of linear payoffs `lin(f, x˜) = 〈f, x˜〉. Then the sequential
complexity bound is
sup
(f ,x)
E1:T sup
M∈Φ
1
T
T∑
t=1
t 〈M ft(),xt()〉 , (11)
which can be upper bounded by R ·L ·diam2(F). Note that these results hold in infinite-dimensional Hilbert
spaces, where a metric entropy-type cover of F would not even be finite.
5.2 Blackwell’s Approachability
Blackwell’s Approachability Theorem [4, 20, 8] is a fundamental result for repeated two-player zero-sum
games. By means of this Theorem, learnability (Hannan consistency) can be established for a wide array
of problems, as illustrated in [8]. For instance, existence of calibrated forecasters can be deduced from
Blackwell’s Approachability Theorem [22, 11].
Let us first discuss the relation of our results to Blackwell’s Theorem. A proof of Blackwell’s Theorem (see
for instance [8]) reveals that (a) martingale convergence has to take place in the payoff space, and (b) the
so-called Blackwell’s one-shot approachability condition has to be satisfied. The former is closely related
to the first term in our Triplex Inequality, while the latter is related to the second term (ability to play
well if the next move is known). What is interesting, in the literature, Blackwell’s Theorem is applied by
embedding the problem at hand into an often high-dimensional space. The dimensionality represents the
complexity of the problem, but this embedding is often artificial. In contrast, the problem complexity is
captured by the third term of our decomposition, the sequential complexity, and it is explicitly written as a
complexity measure rather than an embedding into some other space. The ability to upper bound problem
complexity with tools similar to those developed in [25] (e.g. covering numbers) means that learnability can
be established for a wide class of problems.
In this section we show that Blackwell’s approachability can be viewed as an online game with a particular
performance measure (distance to the set). Using the techniques developed in this paper, we prove Blackwell’s
approachability in Banach spaces for which martingale convergence holds (Theorem 22). We also show that
martingale convergence is necessary for the result to hold (Theorem 24). To the best of our knowledge, both
of these results are novel.
To define the problem precisely, suppose H a subset of a Banach space B and S ⊂ B is a closed convex set.
For the moves f ∈ F of the player and x ∈ X of the adversary, `(f, x) ∈ H is a Banach space valued signal.
The goal of the player is to keep the average of the signals 1T
∑T
t=1 `(ft, xt) close to the set S. To view this
problem as an instance of our general framework, define
B(z1, . . . , zT ) = inf
c∈S
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
zt − c
∥∥∥∥∥ .
The comparator term is zero by our assumption that ΦT contain sequences (φ1, . . . , φT ) of constant mappings
which transform our actions to a point inside S: `φt(f, x) = ct ∈ S for all f ∈ F , x ∈ X , and 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
Thus, indeed, the performance measure is
RT = inf
c∈S
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)− c
∥∥∥∥∥ ,
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the distance to the set S. The next condition on the payoff ` says that it must that the player can choose a
“good” mixed strategy q in response to a given mixed strategy p of the adversary. This strategy q should,
on average, put the payoff inside the set S. Recall that `(q, p) is simply a short-hand for the expected payoff
Ef∼q,x∼p`(f, x) (that is, we do not make any assumptions about linearity of `).
Definition 13. Given a set S, the Blackwell’s approachability game is said to be one shot approachable if
for every mixed strategy p of the adversary, there exists a mixed strategy q for a player such that `(q, p) ∈ S.
Blackwell’s one-shot approachability condition is akin the second term in the Triplex Inequality, where the
order of who plays first is switched. If the one-shot condition is satisfied, it remains to check martingale
convergence.
Definition 14. We will say that martingale convergence holds if
lim
T→∞
sup
M
E
[∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
dt
∥∥∥∥∥
]
= 0,
where the supremum is over distributions M of martingale difference sequences {dt}t∈N such that each
dt ∈ conv(H
⋃−H) .
We now show that, under the one-shot approachability condition, the set is approachable whenever martingale
convergence holds in the subset of the Banach space.
Theorem 22. For any game that is one shot approachable, we have that
VT (`,ΦT ) ≤ 4 sup
M
E
[∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
dt
∥∥∥∥∥
]
where the supremum is over distributions M of martingale difference sequences {dt}t∈N such that each dt ∈
conv(H ⋃−H).
Proof. Now we apply Theorem 1 to the Blackwell Approachability game. Note that for any sequence
(φ1, . . . , φT ), φt maps the payoff to some element of S. Hence, B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT )) = 0 for
any f1, . . . , fT ∈ F , x1, . . . , xT ∈ X . We then conclude that
VT (`,ΦT ) ≤ sup
p1,q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT ,qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
{
B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))− E
f ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
B(`(f ′1, x
′
1), . . . , `(f
′
T , x
′
T ))
}
(12)
+ sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
f1:T∼q1:T
x1:T∼p1:T
B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT )) .
We remark for the upper bound to hold it is enough to assume that ΦT contains some sequence that maps
the payoffs to some element of S.
Consider the two terms in the above bound separately. The first term can be written as
sup
p1,q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT ,qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
E
f ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
{
inf
c∈S
∥∥∥∥∥c− 1T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥− infc′∈S
∥∥∥∥∥c′ − 1T
T∑
t=1
`(f ′t , x
′
t)
∥∥∥∥∥
}
≤ sup
p1,q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT ,qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
E
f ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
{∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)− 1
T
T∑
t=1
`(f ′t , x
′
t)
∥∥∥∥∥
}
≤ sup
p1,q1
E
f1,f ′1∼q1
x1,x
′
1∼p1
. . . sup
pT ,qT
E
fT ,f ′T∼qT
xT ,x
′
T
∼pT
{∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)− 1
T
T∑
t=1
`(f ′t , x
′
t)
∥∥∥∥∥
}
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where in the first inequality we used infa[C1(a)] − infa[C2(a)] ≤ supa[C1(a) − C2(a)] along with a triangle
inequality. This is now bounded by
2 sup
M
E
[∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
dt
∥∥∥∥∥
]
where the supremum is over distributions M of martingale difference sequences {dt}t∈N such that each
dt ∈ conv(H
⋃−H).
The second term in Eq. (12) is
sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
f1:T∼q1:T
x1:T∼p1:T
B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))
= sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
f1:T∼q1:T
x1:T∼p1:T
inf
c∈S
∥∥∥∥∥c− 1T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
f1:T∼q1:T
x1:T∼p1:T
inf
c∈S
{∥∥∥∥∥c− 1T
T∑
t=1
`(qt, pt)
∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(qt, pt)− 1
T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
}
≤ sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
 infc∈S
∥∥∥∥∥c− 1T
T∑
t=1
`(qt, pt)
∥∥∥∥∥+ Ef1:T∼q1:T
x1:T∼p1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(qt, pt)− 1
T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥

≤ sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
{
inf
c∈S
∥∥∥∥∥c− 1T
T∑
t=1
`(qt, pt)
∥∥∥∥∥
}
(13)
+ sup
p1,q1
. . . sup
pT ,qT
E
f1:T∼q1:T
x1:T∼p1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(qt, pt)− 1
T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
where the last inequality uses the fact that supremum is convex and infimum satisfies the following property:
infa [C1(a) + C2(a)] ≤ [infa C1(a)] + [supa C2(a)]. By one shot approachability assumption, we can choose
a particular response qt (in the first term of Eq. (13)) for a given pt to be the mixed strategy that satisfies
`(qt, pt) ∈ S. Since S is a convex set, we conclude that
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(qt, pt) ∈ S
and the first term in Eq. (13) is zero. The second term is trivially upper bounded as
sup
p1,q1
. . . sup
pT ,qT
E
f1:T∼q1:T
x1:T∼p1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(qt, pt)− 1
T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ sup
p1,q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT ,qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(qt, pt)− 1
T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 2 sup
M
E
[∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
dt
∥∥∥∥∥
]
.
Combining the two upper bounds yields the desired result.
We now discuss lower bounds on the value of Blackwell’s approachability game. The first lower bound is
straightforward.
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Proposition 23. Suppose martingale convergence holds. For any Blackwell’s approachability game to have
vanishing regret, one shot approachability for the game is a necessary condition.
We now show that martingale convergence in the space of payoffs is necessary for Blackwell’s approachability.
To the best of our knowledge, this result has not appeared in the literature.
Theorem 24. For every symmetric convex set H there exists a one shot approachable game with payoff’s
mapping to H such that
VT (`,ΦT ) ≥ 1
2
sup
M
E
[∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
dt
∥∥∥∥∥
]
where the supremum is over distributions M of martingale difference sequences {dt}t∈N such that each dt ∈ H.
Proof. Consider the game where adversary plays from set X = H, the player plays from set F = {±1}, and
S = {0}. Suppose the payoff is given by `(f, x) = f ·x. Now consider the adversary strategy where adversary
fixes a H valued tree x and at each time t picks a random t ∈ {±1} and plays xt = txt(f1 ·1, . . . , ft−1 ·t−1)
that is a random sign multiplied with the instance given by the path on the tree specified by f1 · 1, . . . , ft−1 ·
t−1. Further note that since t ∈ {±1} are Rademacher random variables, we see that irrespective of choice
of distribution from which ft is drawn, ft · t is a Rademacher random variable conditioned on history. This
shows that for the above prescribed adversary strategy, we have that for any X valued tree x and any two
player strategies {q∗t } and {q∗t } we have
E
f1∼q∗1
1∼Unif{±1}
. . . E
fT∼q∗T
T∼Unif{±1}
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
(ft · t)x(f1 · 1, . . . , ft−1 · t−1)
∥∥∥∥∥
= E
f1∼q∗1
1∼Unif{±1}
. . . E
fT∼q∗T
T∼Unif{±1}
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
(ft · t)x(f1 · 1, . . . , ft−1 · t−1)
∥∥∥∥∥
= E
f1∼q∗1
1∼Unif{±1}
. . . E
fT−1∼q∗T−1
T−1∼Unif{±1}
E
fT∼q∗T
T∼Unif{±1}
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
(ft · t)x(f1 · 1, . . . , ft−1 · t−1)
∥∥∥∥∥
. . . = E
f1∼q∗1
1∼Unif{±1}
. . . E
fT∼q∗T
T∼Unif{±1}
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
(ft · t)x(f1 · 1, . . . , ft−1 · t−1)
∥∥∥∥∥
The first equality above is due to the fact that fT · T is a Rademacher random variable conditioned on
f1, . . . , fT−1 and 1, . . . , T−1 which means we can replace q∗T with q
∗
T . The subsequent equalities are got
similarly by replacing each q∗t by q∗t one by one inside out by conditioning on f1, . . . , ft−1 and 1, . . . , t−1;
and replacing each q∗t by q∗t . Hence we see that the adversary strategy is an equalizer strategy. Hence using
Proposition 16 and picking the fixed f = 1 we see that
VT ≥ sup
x
E∼Unif{±1}T
[∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
tx()
∥∥∥∥∥
]
≥ 1
2
sup
M
E
[∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
dt
∥∥∥∥∥
]
where the last inequality is because the worst-case martingale difference sequence generated by random signs
(Walsh Paley martingales) are lower bounded by the worst case martingale difference sequences within a
factor of at most two [24].
5.3 Calibration
Calibration, introduced by Brier [7] and Dawid [9], is an important notion for forecasting binary sequences.
In the context of weather forecasting, calibration means that, for the days the forecaster announced “30%
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chance of rain”, the empirical frequency of rain should indeed be close to 30% [8, p. 85]; moreover, this has
to hold for any forecasted value. The existence of calibrated forecasters, a fact which is not obvious a priori,
was shown by Foster and Vohra [12]. Following [8], we consider the notion of λ-calibration. If a forecaster
is λ-calibrated for all λ > 0, we say that the forecaster is well calibrated.
In what follows, we formulate the calibration problem of forecasting {1, . . . , k}-valued sequences in our
general framework. In particular, we are interested in sharp rates on the resulting value of the calibration
game, and we will compare our results with the recent work of Mannor and Stoltz [22].
Fix a norm ‖ · ‖ on Rk. Let H = Rk, F = ∆(k), and X the set of standard unit vectors in Rk (vertices of
∆(k)). Define `(f, x) = 0; that is, the forecaster is penalized only through the comparator term. We define
B(z1, . . . , zT ) = −
∥∥∥ 1T ∑Tt=1 zt∥∥∥. Define ΦT = {(φp,λ, . . . , φp,λ) : p ∈ ∆(k), λ > 0} to contain time-invariant
mappings defined by
`φp,λ(f, x) = 1 {‖f − p‖ ≤ λ} · (f − x) .
This definition of the loss is indeed natural for the λ-calibration problem. It says that, for any p chosen
after the game, if we consider a round when the player predicted f ∈ ∆(k) close to p, the loss should be the
difference between the actual outcome x and f . Indeed, when we put all the definitions together, we obtain
RT = sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
1 {‖ft − p‖ ≤ λ} · (ft − xt)
∥∥∥∥∥ .
Note that this notion of regret allows the worst scale λ to be chosen at the end of the game. This makes
it a stronger requirement than what is required for building a well calibrated forcaster. Nevertheless, we
can bound the value of this game, improving on the results of Mannor and Stoltz [22]. Theorem 25 shows
that the rate of calibration is O˜(T−1/3) no matter what k is. The rate of O˜(T−1/3) has been established for
k = 2 previously. For k > 2, however, the best rates known to us (due to [22]) deteriorate with k. Let us
remark that some looseness of the approach of [22] comes from discretization in order to phrase the problem
as Blackwell’s approachability. A reader will note that we also pass to a discretization in the proof below.
However, this is done late in the analysis in order to upper bound the sequential complexity. This seems
to speak in favor of our approach, aimed at directly looking at the complexity of the problem through the
notion of sequential complexity.
Theorem 25. For the calibration game with k outcomes and with `1 norm, we have that for T ≥ 3 and
some absolute constant c
VT (`,ΦT ) ≤ ck2
(
log T
T
)1/2
.
Proof. Let δ > 0 to be determined later. Let ‖ · ‖ denote the `1 norm. Let Cδ be the maximal 2δ-packing
of ∆(X ) in this norm. Consider the calibration game defined in Example 4, augmented with the restriction
that the player’s choice belongs to Cδ instead of ∆(k). The corresponding minimax expression with this
restriction is clearly an upper bound on the value of the game defined in Example 4.
Observe that the first term in the Triplex Inequality of Theorem 1 is zero. The second term is upper bounded
by a particular (sub)optimal response qt being the point mass on p
δ
t , the element of Cδ closest to pt. Note
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that any 2δ packing is also a 2δ cover. Thus, the second term becomes
sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
sup
φ∈ΦT
− E
x1:T∼p1:T
f1:T∼q1:T
B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))

= sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
E
x1:T∼p1:T
f1:T∼q1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`φp,λ(ft, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ sup
p1
. . . sup
pT
sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
E
x1:T∼p1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
1
{‖pδt − p‖ ≤ λ} · (pδt − xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
which, in turn, is upper bounded via triangle inequality by
sup
p1
. . . sup
pT
sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
E
x1:T∼p1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
1
{‖pδt − p‖ ≤ λ} · (pδt − pt)
∥∥∥∥∥
+ sup
p1
. . . sup
pT
sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
E
x1:T∼p1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
1
{‖pδt − p‖ ≤ λ} · (pt − xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 2δ + sup
p1
. . . sup
pT
sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
E
x1:T∼p1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
1
{‖pδt − p‖ ≤ λ} · (pt − xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
Now note that for a given λ > 0, p1, . . . , pT and p ∈ ∆(k), we have that {1
{‖pδt − p‖ ≤ λ} · (pt − xt)}t∈N is
a martingale difference sequence and so the second term in the triplex inequality is bounded as :
sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
sup
φ∈ΦT
− E
x1:T∼p1:T
f1:T∼q1:T
B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))
 ≤ 2δ + 2√ k
T
. (14)
We now proceed to upper bounded the third term in the Triplex Inequality. Since −B is a subadditive, by
Theorem 2, we have that the third term is bounded by twice the sequential complexity
2RT (`,ΦT ,−B) = 2 sup
f ,x
E1:T sup
φ∈ΦT
−B
(
1`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , T `φT (fT (),xT ())
)
= 2 sup
f ,x
E1:T sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
t1 {‖ft()− p‖ ≤ λ} · (ft()− xt())
∥∥∥∥∥
where f is a Cδ-valued tree. Using the fact that f is a discrete-valued tree, not a ∆(k)-valued tree, we would
like to pass from the supremum over λ > 0 and p ∈ ∆(k) to a supremum over finite discrete set in order to
appeal to Proposition 6.
To this end, fix f ,x and 1:T and let us see how many genuinely different functions can we get by varying
λ > 0 and p ∈ ∆(k). This question boils down to looking at the size of the class
G := {gp,λ(f) = 1 {‖f − p‖ ≤ λ} : p ∈ ∆(k), λ > 0}
over the possible values of f ∈ Cδ. Indeed, if gp,λ(f) = gp′,λ′(f) for all f ∈ Cδ, then
1
T
T∑
t=1
1 {‖ft()− p‖ ≤ λ} · (ft()− xt()) = 1
T
T∑
t=1
1 {‖ft()− p′‖ ≤ λ′} · (ft()− xt()).
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We appeal to VC theory for bounding the size of G over Cδ. First, we claim that the VC dimension of G
is O(k2). Note that G is the class of indicators over `1 balls of radius λ centered at p for various values of
p, λ. A result of Goldberg and Jerrum [14] states that for a class G of functions parametrized by a vector
of length d, if for g ∈ G and f ∈ F , 1 {g(f) = 1} can be computed using m arithmetic operations, the VC
dimension of G is O(md). In our case, the functions in G are parametrized by k values and membership
‖f − p‖1 ≤ λ can be established in O(k) operations. This yields O(k2) bound on the VC dimension of G. By
Sauer-Shelah Lemma, the number of different labelings of the set Cδ by G is bounded by |Cδ|c·k2 for some
absolute constant c. We conclude that the effective number of different (p, λ) is finite. Let us remark that
the VC upper bound is not used in place of the sequential Littlestone’s dimension. It is only used to show
that the set ΦT is finite, and such technique can be useful when the set of player’s actions is finite.
Hence, there exists a finite set S of pairs (λ, p) with cardinality |S| ≤ |Cδ|c·k2 such that
2RT (`,ΦT ,−B) ≤ 2 sup
f ,x
E1:T sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
t1 {‖ft()− p‖1 ≤ λ} · (ft()− xt())
∥∥∥∥∥
1
= 2 sup
f ,x
E1:T max
(p,λ)∈S
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
t1 {‖ft()− p‖1 ≤ λ} · (ft()− xt())
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2 k1/2 sup
f ,x
E max
(p,λ)∈S
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
t1 {‖ft()− p‖1 ≤ λ} · (ft()− xt())
∥∥∥∥∥
2
Now note that ‖ · ‖22 is (2, 2)-smooth and so applying Lemma 8 with G = ‖ · ‖2, γ = 2, η = 2, we see that
2RT (`,ΦT ,−B) ≤ 2k1/2
(
8 log(2|S|)
T
)1/2
≤ 2k1/2
(
16ck2 log(|Cδ|)
T
)1/2
= c′k3/2
(
log(|Cδ|)
T
)1/2
for some small absolute constant c′.
Now note that the size of set Cδ the 2δ packing of ∆(k) is upper bounded by the size of the minimal δ cover
of ∆(k) which can be bounded as |Cδ| ≤
(
1
δ
)k−1
and so we see that
2RT (`,ΦT ,−B) ≤ c′k2
(
log(1/δ)
T
)1/2
.
Combining the above upper bound on the third term of triplex inequality and Equation 14 that bounds the
second term of the triplex inequality (and since first term is anyway 0) we see that,
VT ≤ 2δ + 2
√
k
T
+ c′k2
(
log(1/δ)
T
)1/2
.
Choosing δ = 1/T concludes the proof.
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5.4 Other Examples
5.4.1 External Regret with Global Costs
Let us consider a more general setting where the (vector) loss is `(f, x) rather than the specific choice f  x
in Example 5. The Triplex Inequality and Theorem 2 then gives
VT ≤ sup
p1,q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT ,qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
E
f ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
(`(ft, xt)− `(f ′t , x′t))
∥∥∥∥∥
+ sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
sup
f∈F
E
f1:T∼q1:T
x1:T∼p1:T
{∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥−
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(f, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
}
+ 2 sup
x
E1:T sup
f∈F
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
t`(f,xt())
∥∥∥∥∥ .
Consider the first term in the Triplex Inequality. Observe that (`(ft, xt)− `(f ′t , x′t))Tt=1 is a (vector valued)
martingale difference sequence and so
sup
p1,q1
E
f1,f ′1∼q1
x1,x
′
1∼p1
. . . sup
pT ,qT
E
fT ,f ′T∼qT
xT ,x
′
T
∼pT
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
(`(ft, xt)− `(f ′t , x′t))
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 2 supM E
[∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
dt
∥∥∥∥∥
]
.
where the supremum is over distributions M of martingale difference sequences {dt}t∈N such that each
dt ∈ conv(H
⋃−H).
Now, consider the second summand above:
sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
sup
f∈F
E
f1:T∼q1:T
x1:T∼p1:T
{∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥−
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(f, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
}
= sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
 Ef1:T∼q1:T
x1:T∼p1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥− inff∈F Ex1:T∼p1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(f, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥

≤ sup
p1
. . . sup
pT
{
E
x1:T∼p1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥− inff∈F Ex1:T∼p1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(f, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
}
where in the last step a (sub)optimal choice was made for qt: the distribution qt = δft puts all the mass on
ft such that
‖`(ft, pt)‖ = inf
f∈F
‖`(f, pt)‖.
Observe that by several applications of triangle and Jensen’s inequalities,
E
x1:T∼p1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥− inff∈F Ex1:T∼p1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(f, xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
≤
{∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, pt)
∥∥∥∥∥− inff∈F
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(f, pt)
∥∥∥∥∥
}
+ E
x1:T∼p1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
(`(ft, xt)− `(ft, pt))
∥∥∥∥∥ (15)
Now we make an important assumption.
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Assumption 1. Suppose that, for any p1, p2,
inf
f
‖`(f, p1) + `(f, p2)‖ ≥ inf
f
‖`(f, p1)‖+ inf
f
‖`(f, p2)‖ .
Under Assumption 1, along with the way we chose ft, the first term in (15) becomes∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, pt)
∥∥∥∥∥− inff∈F
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
`(f, pt)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1T
T∑
t=1
‖`(ft, pt)‖ − 1
T
T∑
t=1
inf
f∈F
‖`(f, pt)‖ = 0 .
We conclude that the second term in the Triplex Inequality can be upper bounded by
sup
p1
. . . sup
pT
E
x1:T∼p1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
(`(ft, xt)− `(ft, pt))
∥∥∥∥∥ ,
which, in turn, is no worse than the supremum over distributions M of martingale difference sequences used
to bound the first term.
This gives us the general upper bound on the value of the game:
VT ≤ 4 sup
M
E
[∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
dt
∥∥∥∥∥
]
+ 2 sup
x
E1:T sup
f∈F
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
t`(f,xt())
∥∥∥∥∥ . (16)
Let us see what this implies in a specific case of interest.
Global Cost Learning on the Simplex Here we consider Example 5, the setting studied in Even-Dar
et al [10]. Let F = ∆(k), X = [0, 1]k and `(f, x) = f  x. Let us first verify if Assumption 1 holds here. By
linearity of the vector loss, we just have to verify whether, for arbitrary p1, p2, we have
inf
q∈∆(k)
∥∥q  p1 + q  p2∥∥ ≥ inf
q∈∆(k)
∥∥q  p1∥∥+ inf
q∈∆(k)
∥∥q  p2∥∥ .
where the notation pi stands for the mean of the distribution pi. This is equivalent to asking whether the
function
x 7→ inf
f∈F
‖f  x‖
is concave. Lemma 41 in the appendix proves that it is. Note that in [10], it is shown that the above function
is concave for the `p norms (including p =∞). It turns out that it remains concave no matter what norm is
chosen. Thus, the general upper bound (16) holds. In the case we are considering, we can further massage
the second term in that upper bound. Note that for any f and y, ‖f  y‖ ≤ ‖f‖∞‖y‖ ≤ ‖y‖. Hence, we
have
sup
f∈F
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
t(f  xt())
∥∥∥∥∥ = supf∈F
∥∥∥∥∥f 
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
txt()
)∥∥∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
txt()
∥∥∥∥∥
Hence using the above in (16) we see that
VT ≤ 4 sup
M
E
[∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
dt
∥∥∥∥∥
]
+ 2 sup
x
E1:T
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
txt()
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 6 sup
M
E
[∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
dt
∥∥∥∥∥
]
where the last inequality is because (txt())
T
t=1 is a martingale difference sequence. In the last inequality the
supremum is over distributions M of martingale difference sequences {dt}t∈N such that each dt ∈ [−1, 1]k.
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5.4.2 Adaptive Regret
To study online learning in changing environment Hazan and Seshadhri defined the notion of adaptive regret
in [17]. The notion of adaptive regret introduced in [17] was mainly one where cumulative loss for any time
interval is compared to the best predictor at hindsight for that particular interval. We first extend the notion
of adaptive regret in [17] to include departure mappings as,
RT := sup
[r,s]⊆[T ]
{
1
T
s∑
t=r
loss(ft, xt)− inf
ψ∈Ψ
1
T
s∑
t=r
loss(ψ ◦ ft, xt)
}
(17)
where loss : F × X 7→ [0, 1] is some arbitrary loss function and Ψ is some class of departure mappings. The
key idea in the above definition of regret is that we consider the worst time interval and consider the regret
for that time interval versus some fixed set of departure mappings.
We capture the above notion of regret in our framework by defining :
• `(f, x) = 0 for all f ∈ F and x ∈ X
• Define the set of time-invariant payoff transformations ΦT = IT×ΨT where ΨT = {(ψ, . . . , ψ) : ψ ∈ Ψ}
and Ψ is some class of departure mappings and IT = {([r, s], . . . , [r, s]) : [r, s] ⊆ [T ]}, the set of all
intervals in [T ] repeated T times.
• For each t ∈ [T ] and φt = (It, ψt), define `φt(f, x) = (−loss(f, x) + loss(ψt ◦ f, x)) 1 {t ∈ It}
• B(z1, . . . , zT ) =
∑T
t=1 zt/T
Note that
RT = sup
[r,s]⊆[T ]
{
1
T
s∑
t=r
loss(ft, xt)− inf
ψ∈Ψ
1
T
s∑
t=r
loss(ψ ◦ ft, xt)
}
= sup
I∈IT ,ψ∈ΨT
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
loss(ft, xt)1 {t ∈ It} − 1
T
T∑
t=1
loss(ψt ◦ ft, xt)1 {t ∈ It}
}
= B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))− inf
φ∈ΦT
B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))
and thus we see that the adaptive regret defined in Equation (17) falls under our general framework. We
would like to point out as an example that if we take ΨT = {(f, . . . , f) : f ∈ F} the time invariant set of
constant mappings then the regret defined in Equation (17) is identical to the one in [17]. Below we show a
bound on the value of the game with adaptive regret in terms of covering number of the departure mapping
class.
Theorem 26. For the adaptive regret game we have that
VT ≤ 8 inf
α>0
{
α+ 6
√
2
∫ 2
α
√
log N∞(δ,Ψ, T )
T
dδ
}
+ 96
√
log T
T
(18)
6 High Probability Bounds
The definition of value of the game provided in Equation (2) only guarantees existence of a randomized
algorithm which in expectation over its randomization achieves regret bounded by the value. Even with
Markov inequality this is not sufficient to prove almost sure convergence but only convergence in expectation
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(or probability). We now define for any θ > 0 an alternative notion of a value of the game VθT (`,ΦT ). It
guarantees existence of a randomized online learning algorithm which in T rounds achieves regret smaller
than θ with probability at least 1−VθT (`,ΦT ) over its randomization. Using this value we are able to prove
almost sure convergence for many games.
Definition 15. For any θ > 0 define the value of the game as
VθT (`,ΦT ) = inf
q1
sup
x1
E
f1∼q1
. . . inf
qT
sup
xT
E
fT∼qT
1
{
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))} > θ
}
(19)
It is natural to think of the sequence of infima, suprema, and expectations as a stochastic process which
generates ft’s and xt’s. The “in-expectation” version of the value of the game, defined in (2), is the expected
performance measure RT under a draw from this stochastic process. The “in probability” Definition 15 is
the probability that the performance measure RT exceeds a threshold θ.
The above value of the game is related to the expected version of the value of the game. To see this, note
that whenever RT is a non-negative random variable, by Markov inequality we can conclude that
VθT (`,ΦT ) ≤
VT (`,ΦT )
θ
for any θ > 0. Similarly if B is bounded by L then we can conclude that
VT (`,ΦT ) ≤ inf
θ>0
{
θ + 2L VθT (`,ΦT )
}
.
Since it is possible to bound expectation by integrating tail probabilities, we will sometimes get better bounds
on the expected version of the value by integrating VθT (`,ΦT ) with respect to θ.
Note that bounding VθT (`,ΦT ) will guarantee, for a fixed T and θ, the existence of a player strategy whose
regret against any adversary will not exceed θ with high probability. Such a guarantee may already suffice
in many cases. However, sometimes we want to prove the existence of Hannan consistent player strategies:
player strategies for a game with infinitely many rounds t = 1, 2, . . . such that RT → 0 almost surely against
any adversary. We will not pursue a formal development of such infinite round games here. Instead, we
will show later (in Section 6.2) how the tools developed below allow us to prove the existence of Hannan
consistent strategies for the calibration game. Similar arguments can be used to show the existence of
Hannan consistent player strategies for other games provided some anaologue of the so-called “doubling
trick” is available.
The rest of the section is devoted to tools for bounding the value of the game as defined in Definition 15.
First, we provide the probability version of the Triplex Inequality.
Theorem 27 (Analogue of Theorem 1). For any θ > 0, we have a probabilistic version of the Triplex
Inequality:
VθT (`,ΦT ) ≤ sup
D
PD (B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT )) > θ/3)
+ sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
1
{
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))} > θ/3
}
+ sup
D
PD
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))} > θ/3
)
where D ranges over distributions over sequences (x1, f1), . . . , (xT , fT ).
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Note that D can be thought of as sequence of conditional distributions {(pt, qt)}Tt=1, where pt : (F ,X )t−1 7→
P, qt : (F ,X )t−1 7→ Q.
We remark that the second term in the bound of Theorem 27 is deterministically either one or zero for a
given θ.
After the decomposition of Theorem 27 has been established, we turn to upper bounds on the three terms.
Recall that, roughly speaking, the first term is typically bounded via martingale convergence, the second
term is bounded by the choice of the best response to the strategy of the adversary, and the third term
is bounded by sequential complexity. For the third term, we again apply the sequential symmetrization
technique, but now in probability instead of expectation. This requires a bit more work. In particular, for
the probabilistic version of Theorem 2 we first need the following mild assumption. We require that there is
some T0 <∞ such that for all T > T0, for any fixed φ ∈ ΦT ,
sup
D
PD
(
B(`φ1(q1, p1)− `φ1(f ′1, x′1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT )− `φT (f ′T , x′T )) > θ/6
∣∣∣ (f1, x1), . . . , (fT , xT )) < 1/2
(20)
Here (f ′1, x
′
1), . . . , (f
′
T , x
′
T ) is a sequence tangent to the sequence (f1, x1), . . . , (fT , xT ), drawn from the distri-
butions (q1, p1), . . . , (qT , pT ). We remark that the assumption of Eq. (20) is mild and will always be satisfied
(for T large enough) in the problems we consider. Indeed, the tangent sequence is independent, given the
original sequence, and so (20) is a statement about the behavior of B for zero-mean independent random
variables.
Theorem 28. Suppose B is sub-additive. Fix θ > 0 and suppose T is large enough so that (20) is satisfied.
Then the third term in the Triplex Inequality is bounded by
4 sup
x,f
P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(1`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , T `φT (fT (),xT ())) > θ/12
)
.
If, on the other hand, −B is subadditive, the third term in the Triplex Inequality is instead bounded by
4 sup
x,f
P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
−B(1`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , T `φT (fT (),xT ())) > θ/12
)
The following lemma is useful for bounding the first term of the Triplex Inequality in Theorem 27 when the
function B is smooth in each of its arguments.
Lemma 29. For any H-valued martingale difference sequence {zt}Tt=1 such that ‖zt‖ ≤ η, if B : HT 7→ R+ is
such that Bq is (σ, p)-smooth in each of its arguments and if for all t ∈ [T ], ∥∥∇tBq(z1, . . . , zt−1, 0, . . . , 0)∥∥ ≤
R, then
P (B(z1, . . . , zT ) > θ) ≤ exp
(
− (θ
q − σTηp/p)2
2η2R2T
)
.
In particular, using Lemma 29 above we can upper bound the third term of the triplex inequality for finite
sets of payoff transformations.
Corollary 30. For any finite set of payoff transformations ΦT , under the conditions of Lemma 29
sup
D
PD
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(`φ1(q1, p1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT )− `φT (fT , xT )) > θ
)
≤ |ΦT | exp
(
− (θ
q − σT (2η)p/p)2
2η2R2T
)
The above results hold under very general assumptions of smoothness of B. Stronger results are attainable if
we make an additional assumption that B is a function of the average of its coordinates. The next subsection
is devoted to this assumption.
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6.1 When B is a Function of the Average
Throughout this section, we assume that B is a function of the average of its coordinates:
B(z1, . . . , zT ) = G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
zt
)
.
The following upper bound can be derived.
Lemma 31. Suppose G ≥ 0 is sub-additive, 1-Lipschitz in the norm ‖ · ‖, and G(0) = 0. Then
sup
f ,x
P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
> θ
)
≤ N1(θ/2,ΦT , T ) sup
z
P
(
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
tzt()
)
> θ/2
)
where supremum on the right hand side is over H-valued trees.
Lemma 31 upper bounds the probabilistic version of sequential complexity by the size of an `1 cover times
the probability that the norm of a martingale difference sequence generated by random signs is close to zero.
When the norm in question is 2-smooth, we can invoke results on concentration of martingales due to Pinelis
[23]. The results have been re-proven for general 2-smooth functions in the Appendix.
Corollary 32. Under the assumptions of Lemma 31, if G2 is (σ, 2)-smooth with respect to ‖ · ‖ and
‖`φ(f, x)‖ ≤ η for all φ, f, x, then for any T > θ/4σ, we have
sup
f ,x
P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
> θ
)
≤ 2N1(θ/2,ΦT , T ) exp
{
− Tθ
2
16ση2
}
.
When B is a function of the average of its arguments, Lemma 31 and Corollary 32 allow us to control the
third term in the Triplex Inequality by applying Theorem 28. Now, we would like to generalize the above
results in two directions. First, we would like to obtain the Dudley integral-type upper bounds instead of
the `1-cover at a fixed scale. Second, we wish to consider norms which are p-smooth for 1 < p ≤ 2. Both the
extensions enlarge the scope of problems that can be addressed and also make the upper bounds sharp.
We start by considering the real-valued case with the goal of obtaining upper bounds using the chaining
technique.
Proposition 33. Suppose H ⊆ [−1, 1]. We have that for any θ >√8/T ,
P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt()) > inf
α
{
4α+ 12θ
∫ 1
α
√
logN∞(δ,ΦT , T )dδ
})
≤ L exp{−Tθ2/2}
where L is a constant such L >
∑∞
j=1N∞(2−j ,ΦT , T )−1. In particular, for time-invariant constant departure
mappings,
P
(
sup
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
tf(xt()) > inf
α
{
4α+ 12θ
∫ 1
α
√
logN∞(δ,F , T )dδ
})
≤ L exp{−Tθ2/2}
Furthermore, we have,
P
(
sup
f∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
tf(xt()) > 128 RT (F)
(
1 + θ
√
T log3(2T )
))
≤ L exp{−Tθ2/2}
where RT (F) is the sequential Rademacher complexity of F as defined in (9).
35
The next lemma generalizes Proposition 33 to 2-smooth norms. Its proof is almost identical to that of
Proposition 33 and will be omitted.
Lemma 34. Assume that G ≥ 0 is 1-Lipschitz w.r.t. norm ‖ · ‖, sub-additive, G(0) = 0, and G2 is (σ, 2)-
smooth. Further, suppose that for any x ∈ X , f ∈ F , φ ∈ ΦT and t ∈ [T ], it is true that ‖`φt(f, x)‖ ≤ 1.
Then for any θ >
√
8σ/T :
P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
> inf
α>0
{
4α+ 12θ
∫ 1
α
√
logN∞(δ,ΦT , T )dδ
})
≤ L exp
{
−Tθ
2
4σ
}
where L is a constant such L > 2
∑∞
j=1N∞(2−j ,ΦT , T )−1.
We now turn to the goal of proving upper bounds for general p-smooth norms. The following lemma is the
main building block for Lemma 36. It provides a large deviation inequality for (Walsh-Paley) martingale
difference sequences in a (σ, p)-smooth Banach space. As such, it may be of independent interest.
Lemma 35. Let (B, ‖ · ‖) be a (σ, p)-smooth space. Let x be any B-valued tree of depth T with ‖xt()‖ ≤ R
for any t, . For any ν > 8σ1/p log3/2 T/T 1−1/p, we have that
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
txt()
∥∥∥∥∥ > 128 σ1/pRT 1−1/p + 128 νR
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− ν
2T 2−2/p
2σ2/p log3 T
)
.
With the above concentration inequality in hand, we can now derive a Dudley integral type bound when H
is a subset of a (σ, p)-smooth space.
Theorem 36. Assume that G ≥ 0 is 1-Lipschitz w.r.t. norm ‖ · ‖ and that (B, ‖ · ‖) is a (σ, p)-smooth space.
Further, suppose that for any x ∈ X , f ∈ F , φ ∈ ΦT and t ∈ [T ], it is true that ‖`φt(f, x)‖ ≤ 1. Then for
any θ > 1024σ
1/p log3/2 T
T 1−1/p :
P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
>
768σ1/p
T 1−1/p
+ inf
α>0
{
4α+ 36θ
∫ 1
α
√
logN∞(δ,ΦT , T )dδ
})
≤ L exp
{
− θ
2T 2−2/p
65536 σ2/p log3 T
}
where L is a constant such L > 2
∑∞
j=1N∞(2−j ,ΦT , T )−1.
6.2 An Almost-Sure Bound for Calibration
For the calibration game, using the tools developed above, we first show the existence of a player strategy
guaranteeing small regret with arbitrarily high probability.
Theorem 37. For the calibration game with k outcomes and with `1 norm, we have that for any θ >
3
T ,
VθT ≤ 8 exp
(
−T (θ/12)
2
16k
+ ck3 log(T )
)
(21)
where c is a fixed numerical constant. The inequality (21) above can be restated as: For any η ∈ (0, 1), there
is a player strategy such that, with probability at least 1− η,
RT ≤ 48
√
k log(8/η) + ck4 log T
T
for T ≥ 3.
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Proof of Theorem 37. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 25, with the exception of controlling
appropriate quantities in probability in stead of in expectation. We consider the value of the game VθT (`,ΦT )
as in Definition 15 for some θ > 0. Let δ > 0 to be determined later. Let ‖ · ‖ denote the `1 norm. Let
Cδ be the maximal 2δ-packing of ∆(X ) in this norm. Consider the calibration game defined in Example 4,
augmented with the restriction that the player’s choice belongs to Cδ instead of ∆(k). The corresponding
minimax expression with this restriction is clearly an upper bound on the value of the game defined in
Example 4.
We now use the probabilistic version of the Triplex Inequality defined (Theorem 27). Observe that the first
term in the Triplex Inequality is zero. The second term is upper bounded by a particular (sub)optimal
response qt being the point mass on p
δ
t , the element of Cδ closest to pt. Note that any 2δ packing is also a
2δ cover. Thus, the second term becomes
sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
1
{
sup
φ∈ΦT
{−B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))} > θ/3
}
≤ sup
p1
. . . sup
pT
1
{
sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
Ext∼pt`φp,λ(pδt , xt)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≥ θ/3
}
= sup
p1
. . . sup
pT
1
{
sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
1
{‖pδt − p‖ ≤ λ} · (pδt − pt)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≥ θ/3
}
≤ 1 {δ ≥ θ/3}
We now proceed to upper bounded the third term in the Triplex Inequality. If T is large enough such that
the conditions of Theorem 28 are satisfied, the third term in the Triplex Inequality is upper bounded by
4 sup
x,f
P
(
sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
t1 {‖ft()− p‖ ≤ λ} · (ft()− xt())
∥∥∥∥∥ > θ/12
)
since −B is a subadditive.
Note that f is a Cδ-valued tree, not a ∆(k)-valued tree. Using this fact, we would like to pass from the
supremum over λ > 0 and p ∈ ∆(k) to a supremum over finite discrete set.
To this end, fix f ,x and 1:T and let us see how many genuinely different functions can we get by varying
λ > 0 and p ∈ ∆(k). This question boils down to looking at the size of the class
G := {gp,λ(f) = 1 {‖f − p‖ ≤ λ} : p ∈ ∆(k), λ > 0}
over the possible values of f ∈ Cδ. Indeed, if gp,λ(f) = gp′,λ′(f) for all f ∈ Cδ, then
1
T
T∑
t=1
1 {‖ft()− p‖ ≤ λ} · (ft()− xt()) = 1
T
T∑
t=1
1 {‖ft()− p′‖ ≤ λ′} · (ft()− xt()).
We appeal to VC theory for bounding the size of G over Cδ. First, we claim that the VC dimension of G
is O(k2). Note that G is the class of indicators over `1 balls of radius λ centered at p for various values of
p, λ. A result of Goldberg and Jerrum [14] states that for a class G of functions parametrized by a vector
of length d, if for g ∈ G and f ∈ F , 1 {g(f) = 1} can be computed using m arithmetic operations, the VC
dimension of G is O(md). In our case, the functions in G are parametrized by k values and membership
‖f − p‖1 ≤ λ can be established in O(k) operations. This yields O(k2) bound on the VC dimension of G. By
Sauer-Shelah Lemma, the number of different labelings of the set Cδ by G is bounded by |Cδ|c·k2 for some
absolute constant c. We conclude that the effective number of different (p, λ) is finite. Let us remark that
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the VC upper bound is not used in place of the sequential Littlestone’s dimension. It is only used to show
that the set ΦT is finite, and such technique can be useful when the set of player’s actions is finite.
Hence, there exists a finite set S of pairs (λ, p) with cardinality |S| ≤ |Cδ|c·k2 such that
4 sup
x,f
P
(
sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
t1 {‖ft()− p‖ ≤ λ} · (ft()− xt())
∥∥∥∥∥ > θ/12
)
≤ 4 sup
x,f
P
(
max
(p,λ)∈S
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
t1 {‖ft()− p‖ ≤ λ} · (ft()− xt())
∥∥∥∥∥ > θ/12
)
≤ 4|S| sup
z
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
tzt()
∥∥∥∥∥ > θ/12
)
where the supremum is over all 2Bk1 -valued binary trees of depth T , where B
k
1 is a unit `1 ball in Rk. Note
that the ‖ · ‖1 ≤
√
k‖ · ‖2. By Corollary 45,
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
tzt()
∥∥∥∥∥
1
> θ/12
)
≤ P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
tzt()
∥∥∥∥∥
2
> θ/(12
√
k)
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−T (θ/12)
2
16k
)
Now note that the size of set Cδ the 2δ packing of ∆(k) is upper bounded by the size of the minimal δ cover
of ∆(k) which can be bounded as |Cδ| ≤
(
1
δ
)k−1
and so we see that
4|S| sup
z
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
tzt()
∥∥∥∥∥ > θ/12
)
≤ 8
(
1
δ
)ck3
exp
(
−T (θ/12)
2
16k
)
= 8 exp
(
−T (θ/12)
2
16k
+ ck3 log(1/δ)
)
Combining everything we see that,
VθT ≤ 1 {δ ≥ θ/3}+ 8 exp
(
−T (θ/12)
2
16k
+ ck3 log(1/δ)
)
Choosing, δ = 1/T gives
VθT ≤ 1 {1/T ≥ θ/3}+ 8 exp
(
−T (θ/12)
2
16k
+ ck3 log(T )
)
which gives the first statement of the theorem.
We now rewrite the result in terms of a fixed probability of deviation. To this end, set
η
8
= exp
(
−T (θ/12)
2
16k
+ ck3 log(T )
)
which gives
θ = 48
√
k log(8/η) + ck4 log T
T
Note that for any T ≥ 3 and η ∈ (0, 1), we have
T >
1
162(k log(8/η) + ck4 log T )
.
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Hence we conclude that for any η ∈ (0, 1), we have with probability at least 1− η,
RT ≤ 48
√
k log(8/η) + ck4 log T
T
.
The above result almost suffices to get a result stating almost sure convergence. The only issue is that the
player strategy guaranteed above depends on the confidence level η. In the proof of the following result, we
show how to achieve small regret uniformly for all confidence levels η. Then, it is fairly easy to show the
existence of a Hannan consistent strategy for the calibration game.
Theorem 38. Suppose the calibration game is played for infinitely many rounds T = 1, 2, . . .. Then there
exists a player strategy such that against any adversary we have,
lim sup
T→∞
√
T√
3k log(2T ) + ck
4
2 log(T )
·RT ≤ 60 almost surely .
The proof of Theorem 38 can be taken as a general recipe for proving almost sure bounds (and, therefore,
Hannan consistency). The idea is to lift the dependence of the in-probability value VθT (as well as player’s
strategy) on θ by instead considering a closely related value of the form E exp
{
KR2T
}
for some appropriate
T -dependent factor K. Whenever this value is bounded, Markov’s inequality gives tail bounds for a strategy
that does not depend on θ. Together with a doubling trick, this leads to an almost sure convergence guarantee.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. The value of the game, defined in (2), is
VT (`,ΦT ) = inf
q1
sup
p1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . inf
qT
sup
pT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))}
= sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))}
via an application of the minimax theorem. Adding and subtracting terms to the expression above leads to
VT (`,ΦT ) = sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))− E
f ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
B(`(f ′1, x
′
1), . . . , `(f
′
T , x
′
T ))
+ sup
φ∈ΦT
 Ef ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
B(`(f ′1, x
′
1), . . . , `(f
′
T , x
′
T ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))


≤ sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))− E
f ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
B(`(f ′1, x
′
1), . . . , `(f
′
T , x
′
T ))
+ sup
φ∈ΦT
E
f ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
{
B(`(f ′1, x
′
1), . . . , `(f
′
T , x
′
T ))−B(`φ1(f ′1, x′1), . . . , `φT (f ′T , x′T ))
}
+ sup
φ∈ΦT
 Ef ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
B(`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1), . . . , `φT (f
′
T , x
′
T ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))


At this point, we would like to break up the expression into three terms. To do so, notice that expectation
is linear and sup is a convex function, while for the infimum,
inf
a
[C1(a) + C2(a) + C3(a)] ≤
[
sup
a
C1(a)
]
+
[
inf
a
C2(a)
]
+
[
sup
a
C3(a)
]
for functions C1, C2, C3. We use these properties of inf, sup, and expectation, starting from the inside of the
nested expression and splitting the expression in three parts. We arrive at
VT (`,ΦT )
≤ sup
p1
sup
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
sup
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[
B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))− E
f ′
1:T
∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
B(`(f ′1, x
′
1), . . . , `(f
′
T , x
′
T ))
]
+ sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
 sup
φ∈ΦT
E
f ′
1:T
∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
{
B(`(f ′1, x
′
1), . . . , `(f
′
T , x
′
T ))−B(`φ1(f ′1, x′1), . . . , `φT (f ′T , x′T ))
}
+ sup
p1
sup
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
sup
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
 sup
φ∈ΦT
 Ef ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
B(`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1), . . . , `φT (f
′
T , x
′
T ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))


The replacement of infima by suprema in the first and third terms appears to be a loose step and, indeed,
one can pick a particular response strategy {q∗t } instead of passing to the supremum. For instance, this
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can be the best-response strategy for the second term. However, in the examples we have considered so far,
passing to the supremum still yields the results we need. This is due to the fact that the online learning
setting is worst-case.
Consider the second term in the above decomposition. We claim that
sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
 sup
φ∈ΦT
E
f ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
[B(`(f ′1, x
′
1), . . . , `(f
′
T , x
′
T ))−B(`φ1(f ′1, x′1), . . . , `φT (f ′T , x′T ))]

= sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
sup
φ∈ΦT
E
f1:T∼q1:T
x1:T∼p1:T
[B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))]
because the objective
E
f ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
[B(`(f ′1, x
′
1), . . . , `(f
′
T , x
′
T ))−B(`φ1(f ′1, x′1), . . . , `φT (f ′T , x′T ))]
does not depend on the random draws f1, x1, . . . , fT , xT . We then rename f
′
t , x
′
t into ft, xt. This concludes
the proof of the Triplex Inequality.
Proof of Theorem 2. We turn to the third term in the Triplex Inequality. If B is subadditive,
E
f ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
B(`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1), . . . , `φT (f
′
T , x
′
T ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))
≤ E
f ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
B(`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT )).
If, on the other hand, −B is subadditive,
E
f ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
B(`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1), . . . , `φT (f
′
T , x
′
T ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))
≤ − E
f ′1:T∼q1:T
x′
1:T
∼p1:T
B(`φ1(f1, x1)− `φ1(f ′1, x′1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT )− `φT (f ′T , x′T )). (22)
Below assume that B is subadditive, and the proof of the other case is identical.
To prove the bound on the third term in terms of twice sequential complexity, we proceed as in [25], applying
the symmetrization technique from inside out. To this end, first note that,
sup
p1,q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT ,qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
sup
φ∈ΦT
E
f ′1∼q1,...,f ′T∼qT
x′1∼p1,...x′T∼pT
B
(
`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT )
)
≤ sup
p1,q1
E
f1,f ′1∼q1
x1,x
′
1∼p1
. . . sup
pT ,qT
E
fT ,f ′T∼qT
xT ,x
′
T
∼pT
sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT )
)
the above is true because the expectations are pulled outside the suprema, thus resulting in an upper bound.
Now notice that conditioned on history fT , f
′
T are distributed identically and independently drawn from qT .
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Similarly xT , x
′
T are also identically distributed conditioned on history. Hence renaming them we see that
E
fT ,f ′T∼qT
xT ,x
′
T
∼pT
sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT )
)
= E
f ′T ,fT∼qT
x′
T
,xT∼pT
sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT )− `φT (f ′T , x′T )
)
= E
fT ,f ′T∼qT
xT ,x
′
T
∼pT
sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . ,−(`φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT ))
)
where only the last argument of B is changing sign. Thus,
E
fT ,f ′T∼qT
xT ,x
′
T
∼pT
sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT )
)
= ET E
fT ,f ′T∼qT
xT ,x
′
T
∼pT
sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , T (`φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT ))
)
where T is a Rademacher random variable. Furthermore,
sup
pT ,qT
E
fT ,f ′T∼qT
xT ,x
′
T
∼pT
sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT )
)
= sup
pT ,qT
E
f ′T ,fT∼qT
x′
T
,xT∼pT
ET sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , T (`φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT ))
)
≤ sup
xT ,x′T∈X
fT ,f
′
T
∈F
ET sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , T (`φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT ))
)
Proceeding similarly notice that since given history xT−1, x′T−1 and fT−1, f
′
T−1 are distributed independently
and identically we have,
sup
pT−1,qT−1
E
fT−1,f ′T−1∼qT−1
xT−1,x′T−1∼pT−1
sup
xT ,x
′
T
∈X
fT ,f
′
T
∈F
ET sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT−1(f ′T−1, x′T−1)− `φT−1(fT−1, xT−1), T (`φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT ))
)
= sup
pT−1,qT−1
E
fT−1,f ′T−1∼qT−1
xT−1,x′T−1∼pT−1
ET−1 sup
xT ,x
′
T
∈X
fT ,f
′
T
∈F
ET sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , T−1(`φT (f ′T−1, x′T−1)− `φT−1(fT−1, xT−1)), T (`φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT ))
)
≤ sup
xT−1,x′T−1∈X
fT−1,f′T−1∈F
ET−1 sup
xT ,x
′
T
∈X
fT ,f
′
T
∈F
ET sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , T−1(`φT−1(f ′T−1, x′T−1)− `φT−1(fT−1, xT−1)), T (`φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT ))
)
Proceeding in similar fashion introducing Rademacher random variables all the way to 1 we arrive at
sup
p1,q1
E
f1,f ′1∼q1
x1,x
′
1∼p1
. . . sup
pT ,qT
E
fT ,f ′T∼qT
xT ,x
′
T
∼pT
sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT )
)
≤ sup
x1,x′1∈X
f1,f
′
1∈F
E1 . . . sup
xT ,x′T∈X
fT ,f
′
T
∈F
ET sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
1(`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1)), . . . , T (`φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT ))
)
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Subadditivity of B implies B(a− b) ≤ B(a) +B(−b), and thus
B
(
1(`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1)), . . . , T (`φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT ))
)
≤ B
(
1`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1), . . . , T `φT (f
′
T , x
′
T )
)
+B
(
− 1`φ1(f1, x1), . . . ,−T `φT (fT , xT )
)
We, therefore, arrive at
sup
x1,x′1∈X
f1,f
′
1∈F
E1 . . . sup
xT ,x′T∈X
fT ,f
′
T
∈F
ET sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
1(`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1)), . . . , T (`φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT ))
)
≤ 2 sup
f1∈F,x1∈X
E1 . . . sup
fT∈F,xT∈X
ET sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
1`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , T `φT (fT , xT )
)
= 2 sup
(f ,x)
E1:T sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
1`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , T `φT (fT (),xT ())
)
where in the last step we passed to the supremum over (F × X )-valued trees. This concludes the proof for
the case of B being subadditive. Starting from Eq. (22), the proof for the case of −B being subadditive and
convex in each of its coordinates leads to the bound of
2 sup
(f ,x)
E1:T sup
φ∈ΦT
−B
(
1`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , T `φT (fT (),xT ())
)
.
The complete proof can be repeated for the first term in the Triplex Inequality in order to bound it by
2RT (`, I,B) (or respectively 2RT (`, I,−B)).
The following Proposition is immediate from the definition of a smooth function via successive expansions
of each coordinate around zero.
Proposition 39. Assume function B : HT 7→ R is (σ, p)-uniformly smooth in each of its arguments and
that B(0, 0, . . . , 0) = 0. Then
B(z1, . . . , zT ) ≤
T∑
t=1
〈∇tB(z1, . . . , zt−1, 0, . . . , 0), zt〉+
T∑
t=1
σ
p
‖zt‖p
Lemma 40. Assume that for some q ≥ 1, Bq is (σ, p)-uniformly smooth in each of its arguments and
B(0, . . . , 0) = 0. Then we have that
sup
p1
E
z1,z′1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
E
zT ,z′T∼pT
B(z1 − z′1, . . . , zT − z′T ) ≤ ((2η)pσT/p)1/q
where the maximization is over distributions pt with support in the ball η ·B‖·‖ of radius η.
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Proof of Lemma 40. By Proposition 39 we have that
sup
p1
E
z1,z′1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
E
zT ,z′T∼pT
Bq(z1 − z′1, . . . , zT − z′T )
≤ sup
p1
E
z1,z′1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
E
zT ,z′T∼pT
{
T∑
t=1
〈∇tBq(z1 − z′1, . . . , zt−1 − z′t−1, 0, . . . , 0), zt − z′t〉+ σp
T∑
t=1
‖zt − z′t‖p
}
≤ sup
p1
E
z1,z′1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
E
zT ,z′T∼pT
{
T∑
t=1
〈∇tBq(z1 − z′1, . . . , zt−1 − z′t−1, 0, . . . , 0), zt − z′t〉
}
+ sup
p1
E
z1,z′1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
E
zT ,z′T∼pT
{
σ
p
T∑
t=1
‖zt − z′t‖p
}
= sup
p1
E
z1,z′1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
E
zT ,z′T∼pT
{
σ
p
T∑
t=1
‖zt − z′t‖p
}
≤ (2η)pσT/p
Since q ≥ 1, by Jensen’s inequality we conclude that
sup
p1
E
z1,z′1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
E
zT ,z′T∼pT
B(z1 − z′1, . . . , zT − z′T ) ≤ ((2η)pσT/p)1/q
Proof of Lemma 3. The proof follows immediately from Lemma 40.
Proof of Lemma 4. By Proposition 39 we have:
Bq
(
1`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , T `φT (fT (),xT ())
)
≤
T∑
t=1
〈∇tBq(1`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , t−1`φt−1(ft−1(),xt−1()), 0, . . . , 0), t`φt(ft(),xt())〉+ σp
T∑
t=1
‖`φt(ft, xt)‖p
≤
T∑
t=1
tgt
(
`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , `φt(ft(),xt())
)
+ σηpT/p
where in the last line we used the definition of gt as well as an upper bound on the norm. Now by Jensen’s
inequality we get
sup
f ,x
E1:T sup
φ∈ΦT
B
(
1`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , T `φT (fT (),xT ())
)
≤
(
sup
f ,x
E1:T sup
φ∈ΦT
T∑
t=1
tgt
(
`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , `φt(ft(),xt())
)
+ σηpT/p
)1/q
≤
(
sup
f ,x
E1:T sup
φ∈ΦT
T∑
t=1
tgt
(
`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , `φt(ft(),xt())
))1/q
+ (σηp/p)1/qT 1/q
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Proof of Proposition 6. Fix a F × X -valued tree (f ,x). Note that∣∣gt(`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , `φt(ft(),xt()))∣∣
≤ ∥∥∇tBq(1`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , t−1`φt−1(ft−1(),xt−1()), 0, . . . , 0)∥∥∗ ‖`φt(ft(),xt())‖
≤ R · η
Using Lemma 5,
E1:T max
φ∈ΦT
T∑
t=1
tgt
(
`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , `φt(ft(),xt())
)
≤
√√√√2 log(|ΦT |) max
φ∈ΦT
max
∈{±1}T
T∑
t=1
gt
(
`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , `φt(ft(),xt())
)2
≤
√
2η2R2 log(|ΦT |)T
Now using Lemma 4 we obtain the desired result.
Proof of Corollary 7. To appeal to Proposition 6, we need to specify smoothness parameters. It can be
verified that if Gq is (γ, p)-smooth in its argument, then Bq is (γ/T p, p)-smooth. Furthermore,
‖∇tBq(z1, . . . , zT )‖∗ ≤ ρ/T.
The bound of Proposition 6 then becomes
RT (`,ΦT ) ≤
(
2η2 log(|ΦT |)
T
)1/2q
+ (γηp/p)1/qT (1−p)/q .
Proof of Lemma 8. The lemma follows directly from Theorem 46. To see this, just recall the definition
of RT (`,ΦT ):
RT (`,ΦT ) = sup
f ,x
E sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
.
For any fixed pair (f ,x) of trees, the argument of G above is the sum of martingale difference sequences
coming from a finite family. The step size bound B = η/T and smoothness constant σ = γ.
Proof of Lemma 9. For any F and X -valued trees (f ,x),
P
(
max
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
> θ
)
≤ |ΦT | sup
z
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
tzt()
∥∥∥∥∥ > θ
)
(23)
where supremum is over H-valued trees such that ‖zt()‖ ≤ η. Further, by Lemma 35, for any
ν > 8 c η γ1/p log3/2 T/T 1−1/p ,
we have that,
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
tzt()
∥∥∥∥∥ > cγ1/pηT 1−1/p + ν
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− ν
2T 2−2/p
2c2γ2/pη2 log3 T
)
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Plugging this into (23), we get,
P
(
max
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
>
cγ1/pη
T 1−1/p
+ ν
)
≤ 2|ΦT | exp
(
− ν
2T 2−2/p
2c2γ2/pη2 log3 T
)
.
By a standard argument (e.g. Lemma 47) to integrate out the tail, we get
E sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
≤ cγ
1/pη
T 1−1/p
(
1 + 2 log3/2 T
(√
log(2|ΦT |) + 1
))
.
Making trivial over-aaproximations when T ≥ 3 > e and |ΦT | > 1 gives the result.
Proof of Theorem 10. Define β0 = 1 and βj = 2
−j . For a fixed tree (f ,x) of depth T , let Vj be an
`∞-cover at scale βj . For any path  ∈ {±1}T and any φ ∈ ΦT , let v[φ, ]j ∈ Vj a βj-close element of the
cover in the `∞ sense. Now, for any φ ∈ ΦT ,
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
≤ G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t(`φt(ft(),xt())− v[φ, ]Nt )
)
+
N∑
j=1
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t
(
v[φ, ]jt − v[φ, ]j−1t
))
≤
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
t(`φt(ft(),xt())− v[φ, ]Nt )
∥∥∥∥∥+
N∑
j=1
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t
(
v[φ, ]jt − v[φ, ]j−1t
))
≤ max
t∈[T ]
∥∥`φt(ft(),xt())− v[φ, ]Nt ∥∥+ N∑
j=1
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t(v[φ, ]
j
t − v[φ, ]j−1t )
)
Thus,
sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
≤ βN + sup
φ∈ΦT

N∑
j=1
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t(v[φ, ]
j
t − v[φ, ]j−1t )
)
We now proceed to upper bound the second term. Consider all possible pairs of vs ∈ Vj and vr ∈ Vj−1,
for 1 ≤ s ≤ |Vj |, 1 ≤ r ≤ |Vj−1|, where we assumed an arbitrary enumeration of elements. For each pair
(vs,vr), define a real-valued tree w(s,r) by
w
(s,r)
t () =
{
vst ()− vrt () if there exists φ ∈ ΦT s.t. vs = v[φ, ]j ,vr = v[φ, ]j−1
0 otherwise.
for all t ∈ [T ] and  ∈ {±1}T . It is crucial that w(s,r) can be non-zero only on those paths  for which vs and
vr are indeed the members of the covers (at successive resolutions) close in the `∞ sense to some φ ∈ ΦT .
It is easy to see that w(s,r) is well-defined. Let the set of trees Wj be defined as
Wj =
{
w(s,r) : 1 ≤ s ≤ |Vj |, 1 ≤ r ≤ |Vj−1|
}
Using the above notations we see that
E
[
sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)]
≤ βN + E
 sup
φ∈ΦT

N∑
j=1
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t(v[φ, ]
j
t − v[φ, ]j−1t )
)

≤ βN + E
 N∑
j=1
sup
wj∈Wj
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
tw
j
t ()
) (24)
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From the way the trees in Wj are constructed, it is easy to see that maxt∈[T ] ‖wjt ()‖ ≤ 3βj for any wj ∈W j
and any path . Using Theorem 46, we get
E
[
sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)]
≤ βN +
N∑
j=1
6βj
√
γ log(2|Wj |)
T
≤ βN +
N∑
j=1
6βj
√
γ log(2|Vj | · |Vj−1|)
T
≤ βN +
12
√
γ√
T
N∑
j=1
βj
√
log(|Vj |)
≤ βN +
24
√
γ√
T
N∑
j=1
(βj − βj+1)
√
logN∞(βj ,ΦT , T ) .
Using standard arguments to move from the discrerized sum to an integral, this gives the bound,
inf
α
4α+
24
√
γ√
T
∫ 1
α
√
logN∞(β,ΦT , T )dβ .
Proof of Corollary 11. The first statement is trivially verified. In fact, for this to hold we only require that
B is subadditive, affine in its arguments, and B(0, . . . , 0) = 0. Indeed, the expectations can be sequentially
moved inside of B, making the coordinates of B zero, and making the suprema over the distributions
irrelevant.
For the second claim, consider the second term in (4), specialized to the case of departure mappings:
sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
sup
φ∈ΦT
E
f1:T∼q1:T
x1:T∼p1:T
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
`(ft, xt)− `(φt(ft), xt)
}
(25)
Pick a particular (sub)optimal response qt which puts all mass on f
∗
t = arg minf∈F Ex∼pt`(f, x). It follows
that `(ft, xt)− `(φt(ft), xt) ≤ 0, ensuring that the quantity in (25) is non-positive.
The third claim is a straightforward consequence of Theorem 10. Indeed, H ⊂ [−1, 1] and G(x) = |x| which
is non-negative, 0 at 0, Lipschitz and G2 is (2, 2)-smooth.
Proof of Lemma 15. Fix an (F × X )-valued tree (f ,x) of depth T . Let (i0, . . . , ik) be the sequence
which defines intervals of time-invariant mappings for the sequence (φ1, . . . , φT ). Fix  ∈ {±1}T . Let
vi0 , . . . ,vik ∈ V be the elements of the L∞ cover closest to φi0 , . . . , φik , respectively, on the path . That is,
for any a ∈ {i0, . . . , ik},
max
t
‖`φa(ft(),xt())− vat ()‖ ≤ α.
By our assumption, on any interval I, defined by the endpoints a = ij and b = ij+1,
max
t∈{a,...,b−1}
‖`φa(ft(),xt())− `φt(ft(),xt())‖ ≤ α,
Hence,
max
t∈{a,...,b−1}
‖`φt(ft(),xt())− vat ()‖ ≤ 2α
Denoting by a(t) ∈ {i0, . . . , ik} the left endpoint of an interval to which t belongs,
max
t∈{1,...,T}
‖`φt(ft(),xt())− va(t)t ()‖ ≤ 2α
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It is then clear that to construct a 2α-cover for Φk,αT in L∞ norm, it is enough to concatenate trees in V .
More precisely, this is done as follows. Construct a set V k of H-valued trees as
V k = {v′ = v′ (v0, . . . ,vk, i0, . . . , ik) : 1 = i0 ≤ i1 ≤ . . . ≤ ik ≤ T, v0, . . . ,vk ∈ V }
and v′ = v′
(
v0, . . . ,vk, i0, . . . , ik
)
is defined as a sequence of T mappings
v′t() = v
a(t)
t () t ∈ Ia(t)
for any  ∈ {±1}T . Here Ia = {ij , . . . , ij+1 − 1} and a(t) is the index of the interval to which t belongs. In
plain words, we consider all ways of partitioning {1, . . . , T} into k + 1 intervals and defining a new set of
trees out of V in such a way that within the interval, the values are given by a fixed tree from V . As before,
it is clear that
N∞(2α,Φk,αT , T ) = |V k| ≤
(
T
k
)
· N∞(α,Φ, T )k+1,
providing a control on the complexity of Φk,αT .
Lemma 41. Let F be the probability simplex in any dimension. Let ‖ · ‖ be any norm. The function
x 7→ inf
f∈F
‖f  x‖ ,
defined on the positive orthant, is concave.
Proof. Since the function above is absolutely homogeneous and continuous, all we need to prove is
inf
f∈F
‖f  (x+ y)‖ ≥ inf
f∈F
‖f  x‖+ inf
f∈F
‖f  y‖ .
for arbitrary x, y. That is, for arbitrary f, x, y,
‖f  (x+ y)‖ ≥ inf
f∈F
‖f  x‖+ inf
f∈F
‖f  y‖ .
Define h, g ∈ F as follows:
gi =
fi(1 + yi/xi)
Zg
hi =
fi(1 + xi/yi)
Zh
,
where
Zg =
∑
i
fi(1 + yi/xi) Zh =
∑
i
fi(1 + xi/yi) .
Now, as we show below, 1/Zg + 1/Zh ≤ 1. Thus,
‖f  (x+ y)‖ ≥ 1
Zg
‖f  (x+ y)‖+ 1
Zh
‖f  (x+ y)‖
= ‖g  x‖+ ‖h y‖
≥ inf
f∈F
‖f  x‖+ inf
f∈F
‖f  y‖ .
To finish the proof, note that, by Cauchy-Schwarz,(∑
i
fi(1 + yi/xi)
)
·
(∑
i
fi
xi
xi + yi
)
≥
(∑
i
fi
)2
= 1 .
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This shows,
1
Zg
≤
∑
i
fi
xi
xi + yi
.
Similarly, we get
1
Zh
≤
∑
i
fi
yi
xi + yi
.
Adding them, we get
1
Zg
+
1
Zh
≤
∑
i
fi = 1
as claimed. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 16. Consider any equalizer strategy {p∗t } for the adversary. Note that
VT (`,ΦT ) = inf
q1
sup
p1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . inf
qT
sup
pT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))}
≥ inf
q1
E
x1∼p∗1
f1∼q1
inf
q2
E
x2∼p∗2
f2∼q2
. . . inf
qT
E
xT∼p∗T
fT∼qT
{
B (`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))− inf
φ∈ΦT
B (`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))
}
= E
x1∼p1
. . . E
xT∼pT
{
B (`(f, x1), . . . , `(f, xT ))− inf
φ∈ΦT
B (`φ1(f, x1), . . . , `φT (f, xT ))
}
where f ∈ F is any arbitrary choice fixed before starting the game and pt = p∗t ({fs = f, xs}t−1s=1) is defined
by the equalizer strategy.
Lemma 42. For any departure mapping ΦT and any L > 0 we have that
VT (CF ,F ,ΦT ) = VT (LF ,F ,ΦT )
Proof. Note that for any convex x1, . . . , xT we have that
T∑
t=1
xt(ft)− inf
φ∈Φ
T∑
t=1
xt(φ ◦ ft) = sup
φ∈Φ
T∑
t=1
(xt(ft)− xt(φ ◦ ft))
≤ sup
φ∈Φ
T∑
t=1
〈∇xt(ft), ft − φ ◦ ft〉
=
T∑
t=1
〈∇xt(ft), ft〉 − inf
φ∈Φ
T∑
t=1
〈∇xt(ft), φ ◦ ft〉 (26)
For any adversary strategy x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
T ) where each x
∗
t : F t 7→ X and any player strategy f∗ =
(f∗1 , . . . , f
∗
T ) where each f
∗
t : X t−1 7→ F , by Equation (26) we have that
T∑
t=1
〈∇xt(ft), ft〉 − inf
φ∈Φ
T∑
t=1
〈∇xt(ft), φ ◦ ft〉 ≥
T∑
t=1
xt(ft)− inf
φ∈Φ
T∑
t=1
xt(φ ◦ ft)
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where in the above, ft = f
∗
t (〈∇x1(f1), ·〉 , . . . , 〈∇xt−1(ft−1), ·〉) and xt = x∗t (f1, . . . , ft). Now if we take f∗
and x∗ to be the minimax optimal strategies then we see that
VT (LF ,F ,ΦT ) ≥
T∑
t=1
〈∇xt(ft), ft〉 − inf
φ∈Φ
T∑
t=1
〈∇xt(ft), φ ◦ ft〉
≥
T∑
t=1
xt(ft)− inf
φ∈Φ
T∑
t=1
xt(φ ◦ ft)
≥ VT (CF ,F ,ΦT )
Thus we see that the value of the linear game upper bounds the value of the Lipschitz convex game. In
fact the above argument shows that any strategy that provides vanishing regret guarantee against linear
adversary provides vanishing regret gaurantee (with same rate) against convex Lipschitz adversary. This
means that all that one needs to do to solve convex Lipschitz optimization optimally is to be able to solve
online linear optimization optimally and also be able to calculate sub-gradient of a given function at any
desired point.
Further since the set of linear functions is a subset of the set of convex Lipschitz functions we can conclude
that
VT (LF ,F ,ΦT ) ≤ VT (CF ,F ,ΦT )
Hence we conclude the required statement that the value of the linear game is equal to the value of the
convex Lipschitz game.
Lemma 43. Consider a game where player plays from set F adversary from set X and we are give a linear
B, loss ` and transformation set ΦT . Assume that there exists a set X ′, loss function `′ and transformation
set Φ′T such that for any φ ∈ ΦT there exists φ′ ∈ Φ′T such that for x ∈ X and f ∈ F there exists an x′ ∈ X ′
such that for any t ∈ [T ],
`(f, x)− `φt(f, x) ≤ `′(f, x′)− `φ′t(f, x′)
In that case we can conclude that value of the first game is bounded by value of the second game played with
F , X ′, B, `′, Φ′T , that is
VT (`,ΦT ,F ,X ) ≤ VT (`′,Φ′T ,F ,X ′)
Proof. By assumption that for any φ ∈ ΦT there exists φ′ ∈ Φ′T such that for x ∈ X and f ∈ F there exists
an x′ ∈ X ′ such that for any t ∈ [T ],
`(f, x)− `φt(f, x) ≤ `′(f, x′)− `φ′t(f, x′)
We can conclude that since B is linear, for any φ ∈ ΦT there exists φ′ ∈ Φ′T such that for any f1, . . . , fT
and x1, . . . , xT we have that for the corresponding x
′
1, . . . , x
′
T given by our assumption, we have that
B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))
≤ B(`′(f1, x′1), . . . , `′(fT , x′T ))−B(`φ′1(f1, x′1), . . . , `φ′T (fT , x′T ))
Hence we can conclude that
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))}
≤ sup
φ′∈Φ′T
{
B(`′(f1, x′1), . . . , `
′(fT , x′T ))−B(`φ′1(f1, x′1), . . . , `φ′T (fT , x′T ))
}
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Now say q∗ = (q∗1 , . . . , q
∗
T ) where each q
∗
t : (F × X ′)t−1 7→ ∆(F) is the minimax optimal strategy for the
player while playing the second game. Also let p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
T ) where each p
∗
t : (F × X )t 7→ ∆(X ′) be the
minimax optimal strategy for the player while playing the first game. In this case we see that
VT (`,ΦT ,F ,X ) = E
f1∼q∗1
x1∼p∗1
. . . E
fT∼q∗T
xT∼p∗T
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))}
≤ E
f1∼q∗1
x′1∼p∗1
. . . E
fT∼q∗T
x′
T
∼p∗
T
sup
φ′∈Φ′T
{
B(`′(f1, x′1), . . . , `
′(fT , x′T ))−B(`φ′1(f1, x′1), . . . , `φ′T (fT , x′T ))
}
≤ VT (`′,Φ′T ,F ,X ′)
Proof of Theorem 26. We start by applying the Triplex inequality in Theorem 1 along with Theorem 2
we get that :
VT ≤ 2RT (`, I, B) + sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
sup
φ∈ΦT
− Ef1:T∼qt:T
x1:T∼p1:T
B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))
+ 2RT (`,ΦT , B)
= 0 + sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
sup
φ∈ΦT
 Ef1:T∼qt:T
x1:T∼p1:T
1
T
T∑
t=1
(loss(ft, xt)− loss(ψt ◦ ft, xt)) 1 {t ∈ It}
+ 2RT (`,ΦT , B)
where the last inequality above is because the first term of the triplex inequality is 0 as B is linear (see
Corollary 11). If we use qt to be point mass on ft = argmin
f∈F
Ext∼pt [loss(f, xt)] we see that the second term
of the triplex inequality above is bounded above by 0. Hence we can conclude that
VT ≤ 2RT (`,ΦT , B) = 2 sup
f ,x
E
[
sup
ψ∈Ψ,[r,s]⊆[T ]
1
T
T∑
t=1
t (loss(ft(),xt())− loss(ψ ◦ ft(),xt())) 1 {t ∈ [r, s]}
]
To bound the above we use Corollary 11 (noting that `φt(f, x) ∈ [−2, 2]) to get
VT ≤ 8 inf
α>0
{
α+ 6
√
2
∫ 2
α
√
log N∞(δ,ΦT , T )
T
dδ
}
≤ 8 inf
α>0
{
α+ 6
√
2
∫ 2
α
√
log N∞(δ,Ψ, T ) + log(|IT |)
T
dδ
}
.
Now note that |IT | ≤ T 2 and so we get that
VT ≤ 8 inf
α>0
{
α+ 6
√
2
∫ 2
α
√
log N∞(δ,Ψ, T )
T
dδ
}
+ 96
√
log T
T
.
We conclude that whenever covering number of Ψ can be bounded appropriately, adaptive regret can be
bounded at the expense of an extra O
(√
log T
T
)
term.
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Proof of Theorem 27. For any θ ≥ 0, the value of the game VθT (`,ΦT ), defined in (15), is
VθT (`,ΦT )
= inf
q1
sup
p1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . inf
qT
sup
pT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[
1
{
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))} > θ
}]
= sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[
1
{
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))} > θ
}]
via an application of the minimax theorem. Adding and subtracting terms to the expression above leads to
VθT (`,ΦT ) = sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[1 {B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))
+ sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))} > θ
}]
≤ sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[1 {B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))
+ sup
φ∈ΦT
{
B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))
}
+ sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))} > θ
}]
≤ sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[1 {B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT )) > θ/3}
+1
{
sup
φ∈ΦT
{
B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))
}
> θ/3
}
+1
{
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))} > θ/3
}]
At this point, we would like to break up the expression into three terms. To do so, notice that expectation
is linear and sup is a convex function, while for the infimum,
inf
a
[C1(a) + C2(a) + C3(a)] ≤
[
sup
a
C1(a)
]
+
[
inf
a
C2(a)
]
+
[
sup
a
C3(a)
]
for functions C1, C2, C3. We use these properties of inf, sup, and expectation, starting from the inside of the
nested expression and splitting the expression in three parts. We arrive at
VθT (`,ΦT )
≤ sup
p1
sup
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
sup
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[1 {B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT )) > θ/3}]
+ sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[
1
{
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))} > θ/3
}]
+ sup
p1
sup
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
sup
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[
1
{
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))} > θ/3
}]
As mentioned in the corresponding proof of Theorem 1, the replacement of infima by suprema in the first
and third terms appears to be a loose step and, indeed, one can pick a particular response strategy {q∗t }
instead of passing to the supremum.
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Consider the second term in the above decomposition. Clearly,
sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[
1
{
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT )) > θ/3
}]
= sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
1
{
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT )) > θ/3
}
because the objective does not depend on the random draws.
Proof of Theorem 28. Assume that B is sub-additive (the other case is identical).
B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT )) − B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))
≤ B(`φ1(q1, p1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT )− `φT (fT , xT ))
By our assumption we have that for any distribution D and any fixed φ ∈ ΦT ,
PD (B (`φ1(q1, p1)− `φ1(f ′1, x′1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT )− `φT (f ′T , x′T )) ≤ θ/6 | (f1, x1), . . . , (fT , xT )) ≥
1
2
(27)
For a given (f1, x1), . . . , (fT , xT ), let φ
∗ ∈ Φ be the transformation defined as
φ∗ = argmax
φ∈ΦT
B (`φ1(q1, p1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT )− `φT (fT , xT ))
(We are assuming for simplicity that the supremum is achieved; otherwise, we can easily modify arguments
to take care of it). Since φ∗ is fixed given (f1, x1), . . . , (fT , xT ), using Equation (27) we get
1
2
≤ PD
(
B
(
`φ∗1 (q1, p1)− `φ∗1 (f ′1, x′1), . . . , `φ∗T (qT , pT )− `φ∗T (f ′T , x′T )
) ≤ θ/6 ∣∣ (f1, x1), . . . , (fT , xT ))
Define set
A =
{
((f1, x1), . . . , (fT , xT ))
∣∣∣∣∣ supφ∈ΦT B (`φ1(q1, p1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT )− `φT (fT , xT )) > θ/3
}
.
Since the above inequality holds for any (f1, x1), . . . , (fT , xT ), we assert that
1
2
≤ PD
(
B
(
`φ∗1 (q1, p1)− `φ∗1 (f ′1, x′1), . . . , `φ∗T (qT , pT )− `φ∗T (f ′T , x′T )
) ≤ θ/6 ∣∣ ((f1, x1), . . . , (fT , xT )) ∈ A)
It then follows that
1
2
P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(`φ1(q1, p1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT )− `φT (fT , xT )) > θ/3
)
≤ P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(`φ1(q1, p1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT )− `φT (fT , xT )) > θ/3
)
× P
(
B
(
`φ∗1 (q1, p1)− `φ∗1 (f
′
1, x
′
1), . . . , `φ∗T (qT , pT )− `φ∗T (f
′
T , x
′
T )
)
≤ θ/6
∣∣∣ ((f1, x1), . . . , (fT , xT )) ∈ A)
≤ P
(
B(`φ∗1 (q1, p1)− `φ∗1 (f1, x1), . . . , `φ∗T (qT , pT )− `φ∗T (fT , xT ))
−B(`φ∗1 (q1, p1)− `φ∗1 (f
′
1, x
′
1), . . . , `φ∗T (qT , pT )− `φ∗T (f
′
T , x
′
T )) > θ/6
)
.
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By subadditivity of B, the above expression is upper-bounded by
P
(
B(`φ∗1 (f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ∗1 (f1, x1), . . . , `φ∗T (f
′
T , x
′
T )− `φ∗T (fT , xT )) > θ/6
)
≤ P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT )) > θ/6
)
Hence,
sup
D
PD
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(`φ1(q1, p1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT )− `φT (fT , xT )) > θ/3
)
≤ 2 sup
D
PD
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT )) > θ/6
)
= 2 sup
q1,p1
E
x1,x
′
1∼p1
f1,f
′
1∼q1
. . . sup
qT ,pT
E
xT ,x
′
T
∼pT
fT ,f
′
T
∼qT
1
{(
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT )) > θ/6
)}
.
Next, introducing a Rademacher random variable T , the above quantity is equal to
2 sup
q1,p1
E
x1,x
′
1∼p1
f1,f
′
1∼q1
. . . sup
qT ,pT
E
xT ,x
′
T
∼pT
fT ,f
′
T
∼qT
ET
[
1
{(
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , T (`φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT ))) > θ/6
)}]
.
We pass to an upper bound by taking supremum over (fT , xT ), (f
′
T , x
′
T ):
2 sup
q1,p1
E
x1,x
′
1∼p1
f1,f
′
1∼q1
. . . sup
qT−1,pT−1
E
xT−1,x′T−1∼pT−1
fT−1,f′T−1∼qT−1
sup
(fT ,xT ),(f
′
T
,x′
T
)
ET
1
{
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1), . . . , T (`φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT ))) > θ/6
}
.
Repeating the process from inside out, we arrive at the upper bound
2 sup
(f1,x1),(f
′
1,x
′
1)
E1 . . . sup
(fT ,xT ),(f
′
T
,x′
T
)
ET
1
{
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(1(`φ1(f
′
1, x
′
1)− `φ1(f1, x1)), . . . , T (`φT (f ′T , x′T )− `φT (fT , xT ))) > θ/6
}
which can be written using the tree notation as
2 sup
f ,f ′,x,x′
E
[
1
{
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(1(`φ1(f
′
1(),x
′
1())− `φ1(f1(),x1())), . . . , T (`φT (f ′T (),x′T ())− `φT (fT (),xT ()))) > θ/6
}]
= 2 sup
f ,f ′,x,x′
P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(1(`φ1(f
′
1(),x
′
1())− `φ1(f1(),x1())), . . . , T (`φT (f ′T (),x′T ())− `φT (fT (),xT ()))) > θ/6
)
Next, using subadditivity of B, the last quantity can be upper bounded by
2 sup
f ,f ′,x,x′
P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
{
B(1`φ1(f
′
1(),x
′
1()), . . . , T `φT (f
′
T (),x
′
T ())) +B(−1`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . ,−T `φT (fT (),xT ()))
}
> θ/6
)
≤ 2 sup
f ,f ′,x,x′
{
P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(1`φ1(f
′
1(),x
′
1()), . . . , T `φT (f
′
T (),x
′
T ())) > θ/12
)
+P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(−1`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . ,−T `φT (fT (),xT ())) > θ/12
)}
= 4 sup
f ,x
P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(1`φ1(f1(),x1()), . . . , T `φT (fT (),xT ())) > θ/12
)
,
concluding the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 29. By Proposition 39 and the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality for real-valued martingales,
P (B(z1, . . . , zT ) > θ) = P (B
q(z1, . . . , zT ) > θ
q)
≤ P
(
T∑
t=1
〈∇tBq(z1, . . . , zt−1, 0, . . . , 0), zt〉 > θq − σTηp/p
)
≤ exp
(
− (θ
q − σTηp/p)2
2η2R2T
)
.
Proof of Lemma 31. Fix (f ,x) and let V = {v1, . . . ,vN} be a minimal `1-cover of ΦT on (f ,x) of size
N ≤ N1(θ/2,ΦT , T ). Let v[φ, ] ∈ V denote a member of the cover which is close to φ ∈ ΦT on the path .
By sub-additivity of G,
P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
> θ
)
≤ P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
{
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t(`φt(ft(),xt())− v[φ, ]t))
)
+G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
tv[φ, ]t
)}
> θ
)
Using the Lipschitz property of G along with G(0) = 0 and triangle inequality, we can upper bound the last
quantity by
P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
‖`φt(ft(),xt())− v[φ, ]t‖+G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
tv[φ, ]t
)}
> θ
)
≤ P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
tv[φ, ]t
)
> θ/2
)
,
where the last step follows by the definition of the cover. The last quantity can be upper bounded by
P
(
max
v∈V
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
tvt()
)
> θ/2
)
≤
∑
v∈V
P
(
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
tvt()
)
> θ/2
)
≤ |V | sup
z
P
(
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
tzt()
)
> θ/2
)
,
where the supremum is over all H-valued binary trees z of depth T .
Proof of Corollary 32. Follows directly by combining Lemma 31 with Corollary 45.
Proof of Proposition 33. Define β0 = 1 and βj = 2
−j . For a fixed tree (f ,x) of depth T , let Vj be an
`∞-cover at scale βj . For any path  ∈ {±1}T and any φ ∈ ΦT , let v[φ, ]j ∈ Vj a βj-close element of the
cover in the `∞ sense. Now, for any φ ∈ ΦT ,∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
t(`φt(ft(),xt())− v[φ, ]Nt )
∣∣∣∣∣+
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
t
(
v[φ, ]jt − v[φ, ]j−1t
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
t∈[T ]
∣∣`φt(ft(),xt())− v[φ, ]Nt ∣∣+ N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
t(v[φ, ]
j
t − v[φ, ]j−1t )
∣∣∣∣∣
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Thus,
sup
φ∈ΦT
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ βN + supφ∈ΦT

N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
t(v[φ, ]
j
t − v[φ, ]j−1t )
∣∣∣∣∣

We now proceed to upper bound the second term. Consider all possible pairs of vs ∈ Vj and vr ∈ Vj−1,
for 1 ≤ s ≤ |Vj |, 1 ≤ r ≤ |Vj−1|, where we assumed an arbitrary enumeration of elements. For each pair
(vs,vr), define a real-valued tree w(s,r) by
w
(s,r)
t () =
{
vst ()− vrt () if there exists φ ∈ ΦT s.t. vs = v[φ, ]j ,vr = v[φ, ]j−1
0 otherwise.
for all t ∈ [T ] and  ∈ {±1}T . It is crucial that w(s,r) can be non-zero only on those paths  for which vs and
vr are indeed the members of the covers (at successive resolutions) close in the `∞ sense to some φ ∈ ΦT .
It is easy to see that w(s,r) is well-defined. Let the set of trees Wj be defined as
Wj =
{
w(s,r) : 1 ≤ s ≤ |Vj |, 1 ≤ r ≤ |Vj−1|
}
Using the above notations we see that
sup
φ∈ΦT
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ βN + supφ∈ΦT

N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
t(v[φ, ]
j
t − v[φ, ]j−1t )
∣∣∣∣∣

≤ βN +
N∑
j=1
sup
wj∈Wj
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
tw
j
t ()
∣∣∣∣∣ (28)
It is easy to show that maxt∈[T ] |wjt ()| ≤ 3βj for any wj ∈Wj and any path .
In the remainder of the proof we will use the shorthand N∞(β) = N∞(β,ΦT , T ). By Azuma-Hoeffding
inequality for real-valued martingales,
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
tw
j
t ()
∣∣∣∣∣ > θβj√logN∞(βj)
)
≤ 2 exp
{
−Tθ
2 logN∞(βj)
2
}
Hence by union bound we have,
P
(
sup
wj∈Wj
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
tw
j
t ()
∣∣∣∣∣ > θβj√logN∞(βj)
)
≤ 2N∞(βj)2 exp
{
−Tθ
2 logN∞(βj)
2
}
and so
P
(
∃j ∈ [N ], sup
wj∈Wj
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
tw
j
t ()
∣∣∣∣∣ > θβj√logN∞(βj)
)
≤ 2
N∑
j=1
N∞(βj)2 exp
{
−Tθ
2 logN∞(βj)
2
}
Hence clearly
P
 N∑
j=1
sup
wj∈Wj
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
tw
j
t ()
∣∣∣∣∣ > θ
N∑
j=1
βj
√
logN∞(βj)
 ≤ 2 N∑
j=1
N∞(βj)2 exp
{
−Tθ
2 logN∞(βj)
2
}
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Using the above with Equation (28) gives us that
P
 sup
φ∈ΦT
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
∣∣∣∣∣ > βN + θ
N∑
j=1
βj
√
logN∞(βj)
 ≤ 2 N∑
j=1
N∞(βj)2 exp
{
−Tθ
2 logN∞(βj)
2
}
≤ 2
N∑
j=1
exp
{
logN∞(βj)
(
2− Tθ
2
2
)}
Since we assume that 2 < Tθ
2
4 , the right-hand side of the last inequality is bounded above by
2
N∑
j=1
exp
{
−Tθ
2 logN∞(βj)
4
}
≤ 2
N∑
j=1
exp
{
−Tθ
2
4
− logN∞(βj)
}
≤ 2e−Tθ
2
4
N∑
j=1
N∞(βj)−1 .
By our assumption that
∑N
j=1N∞(βj)−1 ≤ L for some appropriate constant L, we see that
P
 sup
φ∈ΦT
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
∣∣∣∣∣ > βN + θ
N∑
j=1
βj
√
logN∞(βj)
 ≤ Le−Tθ24
Now picking N appropriately and bounding sum by integral we have that
βN + θ
N∑
j=1
βj
√
logN∞(βj) ≤ inf
α>0
{
4α+ 12θ
∫ 1
α
√
logN∞(δ)dδ
}
Hence we conclude that
P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
∣∣∣∣∣ 1T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
∣∣∣∣∣ > infα>0
{
4α+ 12θ
∫ 1
α
√
logN∞(δ,ΦT , T )dδ
})
≤ Le−Tθ
2
4
The last statement the Proposition follows from the fact that the Dudley-type integral
inf
α>0
{
4α+ 12θ
∫ 1
α
√
logN∞(δ,ΦT , T )dδ
}
can be upper bounded by
8
(
1 + 4
√
2θ
√
T log3(eT 2)
)
≤ 128
(
1 + θ
√
T log3(2T )
)
times the sequential Rademacher complexity. The proof can be found in [25].
Proof of Lemma 35. Let ‖ · ‖∗ be the norm dual to ‖ · ‖. First note that
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
txt()
∥∥∥∥∥ > c supx E
[∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
txt()
∥∥∥∥∥
](
1 + θ
√
T log3 T
))
= P
(
sup
w:‖w‖∗≤1
1
T
T∑
t=1
t 〈w,xt()〉 > c 1
T
sup
x
E
[
sup
w:‖w‖∗≤1
T∑
t=1
t 〈w,xt()〉
](
1 + θ
√
T log3 T
))
.
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Now, by Proposition 33 for payoff functions `(f, x) = f(x) = 〈f, x〉 and class ΦT being the time-invariant
constant departure mapping class, by noting that supx E
[∥∥∥ 1T ∑Tt=1 txt()∥∥∥] = RT (F) we get that
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
txt()
∥∥∥∥∥ > c supx E
[∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
txt()
∥∥∥∥∥
](
1 + θ
√
T log3 T
))
≤ L exp (−Tθ2/2)
where c = 128. Now note that for a (σ, p)-smooth space we have that
sup
x
E
[∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
txt()
∥∥∥∥∥
]
≤ σ1/p
(
1
T p
sup
x
T∑
t=1
E [‖xt()‖p]
)1/p
≤ σ
1/pR
T 1−1/p
Moreover, the linear class F has covering numbers satisfying N∞(β) ≥ 1/β and hence L < 2. Thus,
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
txt()
∥∥∥∥∥ > c σ1/pRT 1−1/p
(
1 + θ
√
T log3 T
))
≤ 2 exp (−Tθ2/2)
Now setting ν = θσ1/p
√
T log3 T/T 1−1/p gives the required bound as,
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
txt()
∥∥∥∥∥ > c σ1/pRT 1−1/p + cνR
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− ν
2T 2−2/p
2σ2/p log3 T
)
The condition θ >
√
8/T on θ (from Proposition 33) implies that the above is valid only for
ν >
8σ1/p log3/2 T
T 1−1/p
.
Proof of Theorem 36. Define β0 = 1 and βj = 2
−j . For a fixed tree (f ,x) of depth T , let Vj be an
`∞-cover at scale βj . For any path  ∈ {±1}T and any φ ∈ ΦT , let v[φ, ]j ∈ Vj a βj-close element of the
cover in the `∞ sense. Now, for any φ ∈ ΦT ,
sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
= sup
φ∈ΦT
{
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
−G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
tv[φ, ]
N
t
)
+
N∑
j=1
(
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
tv[φ, ]
j
t
)
−G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
tv[φ, ]
j−1
t
))
≤ sup
φ∈ΦT

∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
t(`φt(ft(),xt())− v[φ, ]Nt )
∥∥∥∥∥+
N∑
j=1
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
t(v[φ, ]
j
t − v[φ, ]j−1t )
∥∥∥∥∥

≤ sup
φ∈ΦT
maxt∈[T ] ∥∥`φt(ft(),xt())− v[φ, ]Nt ∥∥+
N∑
j=1
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
t(v[φ, ]
j
t − v[φ, ]j−1t )
∥∥∥∥∥

≤ βN + sup
φ∈ΦT

N∑
j=1
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
t(v[φ, ]
j
t − v[φ, ]j−1t )
∥∥∥∥∥

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Consider all possible pairs of vs ∈ Vj and vr ∈ Vj−1, for 1 ≤ s ≤ |Vj |, 1 ≤ r ≤ |Vj−1|, where we assumed an
arbitrary enumeration of elements. For each pair (vs,vr), define an H-valued tree w(s,r) by
w
(s,r)
t () =
{
vst ()− vrt () if there exists φ ∈ ΦT s.t. vs = v[φ, ]j ,vr = v[φ, ]j−1
0 otherwise.
for all t ∈ [T ] and  ∈ {±1}T . It is crucial that w(s,r) can be non-zero only on those paths  for which vs and
vr are indeed the members of the covers (at successive resolutions) close in the `∞ sense to some φ ∈ ΦT .
It is easy to see that w(s,r) is well-defined. Let the set of trees Wj be defined as
Wj =
{
w(s,r) : 1 ≤ s ≤ |Vj |, 1 ≤ r ≤ |Vj−1|
}
Using the above notations we see that
sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
≤ βN + sup
φ∈ΦT

N∑
j=1
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
t(v[φ, ]
j
t − v[φ, ]j−1t )
∥∥∥∥∥

≤ βN +
N∑
j=1
sup
wj∈Wj
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
tw
j
t ()
∥∥∥∥∥
Now before we proceed note that any wj ∈Wj is such that for any t ∈ [T ] and any  ∈ {±1}T , ‖wjt ()‖ ≤ 3βj .
Hence we see that Wj consists of Yj-valued trees, where Yj = {x : ‖x‖ ≤ 3βj}. Hence
sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
≤ βN +
N∑
j=1
sup
wj∈Wj
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
tw
j
t ()
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ βN +
N∑
j=1
sup
yj
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
ty
j
t ()
∥∥∥∥∥ (29)
where the supremum is over Yj-valued trees.
In the remainder of the proof we will use the shorthand N∞(β) = N∞(β,ΦT , T ) and will use the constant
c = 128. By Lemma 35, for any θ ≥ 8 c σ1/p log3/2 T/T 1−1/p, we have
P
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
ty
j
t ()
∥∥∥∥∥ > 3cσ1/pβjT 1−1/p + 3θβj
√
logN∞(βj)
)
≤ 2 exp
{
−T
2−2/p θ2 logN∞(βj)
2c2σ2/p log3 T
}
.
By the union bound,
P
(
sup
yj
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
ty
j
t ()
∥∥∥∥∥ > 3cσ1/pβjT 1−1/p + 3θβj
√
logN∞(βj)
)
≤ 2 N∞(βj) exp
{
−T
2−2/p θ2 logN∞(βj)
2c2σ2/p log3 T
}
and so
P
(
∃j ∈ [N ], sup
yj
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
ty
j
t ()
∥∥∥∥∥ > 3cσ1/pβjT p−1p + 3θβj
√
logN∞(βj)
)
≤ 2
N∑
j=1
N∞(βj) exp
−T
2(p−1)
p θ2 logN∞(βj)
2c2σ2/p log3 T

Hence,
P
(
N∑
j=1
sup
yj
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
ty
j
t ()
∥∥∥∥∥ > 6σ1/pcT p−1p + 3θ
N∑
j=1
βj
√
logN∞(βj)
)
≤ 2
N∑
j=1
N∞(βj) exp
−T
2(p−1)
p θ2 logN∞(βj)
2c2σ2/p log3 T
 .
60
Using the above with Equation (29) gives us that
P
 sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
>
6σ1/pc
T
p−1
p
+ βN + 3θ
N∑
j=1
βj
√
logN∞(βj)

≤ 2
N∑
j=1
N∞(βj) exp
{
−T
2(p−1)
p θ2 logN∞(βj)
2c2σ2/p log3 T
}
≤ 2
N∑
j=1
exp
{
logN∞(βj)
(
1− T
2(p−1)
p θ2
2c2σ2/p log3 T
)}
Our assumption on θ implies that T
2(p−1)
p θ2
4c2σ2/p log3 T
≥ 2, so that
P
 sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
>
6σ1/pc
T
p−1
p
+ βN + 3θ
N∑
j=1
βj
√
logN∞(βj)

≤ 2
N∑
j=1
exp
{
−T
2(p−1)
p θ2 logN∞(βj)
4c2σ2/p log3 T
}
≤ 2
N∑
j=1
exp
{
− T
2(p−1)
p θ2
4c2σ2/p log3 T
− logN∞(βj)
}
≤ 2 exp
{
− T
2(p−1)
p θ2
4c2σ2/p log3 T
}
N∑
j=1
N∞(βj)−1
Since we have assumed that 2
∑N
j=1N∞(βj)−1 ≤ L, we see that
P
 sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
>
6σ1/pc
T
p−1
p
+ βN + 3θ
N∑
j=1
βj
√
logN∞(βj)
 ≤ L exp{− T 2(p−1)p θ2
4c2σ2/p log3 T
}
Using the arguments employed previously, picking N appropriately and bounding sum by integral we have
that
βN + 3θ
N∑
j=1
βj
√
logN∞(βj) ≤ inf
α>0
{
4α+ 36θ
∫ 1
α
√
logN∞(δ)dδ
}
.
Hence we conclude that
P
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
G
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
t`φt(ft(),xt())
)
>
6σ1/pc
T
p−1
p
+ inf
α>0
{
4α+ 36θ
∫ 1
α
√
logN∞(δ)dδ
})
≤ L exp
{
− T
2(p−1)
p θ2
4c2σ2/p log3 T
}
Proof of Theorem 38. Let α > 0 be a constant that we will fix later. Consider a “subgaussian game”
whose value is defined as:
VSGT (`,ΦT ) = inf
q1
sup
x1
E
f1∼q1
. . . inf
qT
sup
xT
E
fT∼qT
Γ
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))}
)
(30)
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where
Γ(x) := sup
θ
exp(αTθ2/k)1 {x > θ} = exp(αTx2/k) .
Here, we are using the intuition that we expect to find a player strategy using which the regret will have
subgaussian tails. As before, we consider the calibration setting described in Example 4 augmented with
the restriction that the player’s choice belongs to Cδ, a 2δ-maximal packing of ∆(k), instead of ∆(k). The
choice of δ will be fixed later. We now apply the general triplex inequality in Appendix B with
Λ(x) := sup
θ
exp(αTθ2/k)1 {x > θ/3} = exp(9αTx2/k) .
Observe that the first term in the General Triplex Inequality is simply equal to 1. The second term is upper
bounded by a particular (sub)optimal response qt being the point mass on p
δ
t , the element of Cδ closest to
pt. Note that any 2δ packing is also a 2δ cover. Thus, the second term becomes
sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
Λ
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
{−B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))}
)
≤ sup
p1
. . . sup
pT
Λ
(
sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
Ext∼pt`φp,λ(pδt , xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
)
= sup
p1
. . . sup
pT
Λ
(
sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
1
{‖pδt − p‖ ≤ λ} · (pδt − pt)
∥∥∥∥∥
)
≤ Λ (δ) = exp(9αδ2/k) .
By the same reasoning as used in the previous proof, the third term
sup
D
ED
[
Λ
(
sup
p,λ
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
(1 {‖ft − p‖ ≤ λ} (ft − xt)− Et−1 [1 {‖ft − p‖ ≤ λ} (ft − xt)])
∥∥∥∥∥
)]
can be bounded by
sup
D
ED
[
Λ
(
max
(p,λ)∈S
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
(1 {‖ft − p‖ ≤ λ} (ft − xt)− Et−1 [1 {‖ft − p‖ ≤ λ} (ft − xt)])
∥∥∥∥∥
)]
where S is a finite set of cardinality |S| ≤ |Cδ|ck2 . Since Λ is non-decreasing and maximum of positive
quantities is bounded by their sum, we have the upper bound
sup
D
∑
(λ,p)∈S
ED
[
Λ
(∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
(1 {‖ft − p‖ ≤ λ} (ft − xt)− Et−1 [1 {‖ft − p‖ ≤ λ} (ft − xt)])
∥∥∥∥∥
)]
≤ |S| ·MΛ
where MΛ is defined as
MΛ := sup
MDS
E
[
Λ
(∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
Xt
∥∥∥∥∥
)]
.
Here the supremum is over all martingale difference sequences X1, . . . , XT with ‖Xt‖1 ≤ 2/T almost surely.
Since we are considering the case when ‖ · ‖ = ‖ · ‖1, we have
MΛ = sup
MDS
E
exp
9αT ∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
Xt
∥∥∥∥∥
2
1
/k

≤ sup
MDS
E
exp
9αT ∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
Xt
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2

62
Using Corollary 45, we have
E
exp
9αT ∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
Xt
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
 ≤ e+ ∫
θ≥e
P
9αT ∥∥∥∥∥
T∑
t=1
Xt
∥∥∥∥∥
2
2
≥ θ
 dθ
≤ e+
∫
θ≥e
2 exp
(
− log(θ)
288α
)
dθ
≤ e+
∫
θ≥e
2
θ2
dθ ≤ e+ 2 ≤ 5
where we chose α = 1/576 to make 288α = 1/2. This shows that MΛ ≤ 5 and hence the third term is
bounded by 5|S|.
Now putting the upper bounds on the three triplex inequality terms together, we get that
VSGT (`,ΦT ) ≤ 1 + exp
(
Tδ2
64k
)
+ 5
(
1
δ
)ck3
.
Choose δ =
√
k/T to get
VSGT (`,ΦT ) ≤ 3 + 5
(√
T
k
)ck3
≤ 8T ck3/2 .
Using Markov’s inequality now shows that there is a player strategy such that against any adversary and
any θ > 0, we have
P(RT > θ) ≤ 8T ck3/2 exp
(
− Tθ
2
576k
)
.
Equivalently, for the same player strategy, against any adversary and any η ∈ (0, 1), we have with probability
at least 1− η,
RT ≤ 24√
T
·
√
k log
(
8
η
)
+
ck4
2
log(T ) . (31)
Finally to show almost sure convergence we need to use a “doubling trick” similar to the one used in [22].
We divide time into episodes r = 1, 2, . . . with episode r of length 2r. In episode r, the player plays
the optimal strategy for the subgaussian game of length 2r. Thus, episode r lasts during the time steps
Er = {2r−1, . . . , 2r+1−2}. Now fix any adversary for the infinite round game and let us focus on the regret
incurred at some time T . We have,
RT = sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
∥∥∥∥∥ 1T
T∑
t=1
1 {‖ft − p‖ ≤ λ} · (ft − xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
T
dlog2(T )e∑
r=1
sup
λ>0
sup
p∈∆(k)
∥∥∥∥∥∑
t∈Er
1 {‖ft − p‖ ≤ λ} · (ft − xt)
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
T
dlog2(T )e∑
r=1
2r · 24√
2r
·
√
k log
(
8
ηT,r
)
+
ck4
2
log(2r)
with probability at least 1 −∑r<log2(T ) ηT,r. In the last step we used (31) along with a union bound over
episodes. Choosing ηT,r = 1/T
22r ensures that with probability at least 1− 1/T 2, we have
RT ≤ 24(1 +
√
2) ·
√
k log (8T 3) + ck
4
2 log(T )√
T
.
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Since 24(1 +
√
2) ≤ 60, using Borel-Cantelli, this shows that
P
 √T√
3k log(2T ) + ck
4
2 log(T )
·RT > 60 infinitely often
 = 0 .
This proves the theorem.
A Concentration of 2-Smooth Functions of Martingale-Difference
Sums in Banach Spaces
In this section we prove an extension of some of the results of Pinelis [23]. Let (H, ‖ · ‖) be a separable
Banach space such that there is a function G : H → R with the following properties:
G(0) = 0
|G(v + w)−G(v)| ≤ ‖w‖ (Lipschitz)
(G2)′′(v)[w,w] ≤ σ‖w‖2 (G2 is (σ, 2)-smooth)
Suppose we have an H-valued MDS {Xt}Tt=1. Define the partial sums S0 = 0, St =
∑
s≤tXt for t > 0.
Define, for t ≥ 0,
Zt = cosh(λG(St))
The following lemma is embedded in proof of Theorem 3.2 in Pinelis. Assume σ ≥ 1 for simplicity. Otherwise,
everything below works by replacing σ with max{σ, 1}.
Lemma 44. Suppose ‖Xt‖ ≤ B a.s. and fix λ > 0. Then Zt/ct is a supermartingale where
c = 1 + σ(exp(λB)− 1− λB) .
In particular, we have
E [ZT ] ≤ cT .
Proof. The key step is to define a scalar function φ : [0, 1]→ R:
φ(α) := Et−1 [cosh(λG(St−1 + αXt))] .
Note that φ(1) = Et−1 [Zt] and φ(0) = Zt−1, so our goal is to prove φ(1) ≤ c · φ(0). We compute the first
two derivatives of φ,
φ′(α) = Et−1
[
sinh(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) · λg′St−1,Xt(α)
]
,
φ′′(α) = Et−1
[
cosh(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) · (λg′St−1,Xt(α))2
]
(32)
+ Et−1
[
sinh(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) · λg′′St−1,Xt(α)
]
, (33)
where, for any S,X ∈ H, we define gS,X(α) = G(S + αX). Note that
g′S,X(α) = G
′(S + αX)(X) ,
g′′S,X(α) = G
′′(S + αX)(X,X) .
Now, consider two cases.
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Case 1: sign(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) = sign(g
′′
St−1,Xt(α)). In this case, we use the fact that sign(sinh(x)) = sign(x cosh(x)
and that | sinh(x)| ≤ |x cosh(x)|, to obtain the upper bound
cosh(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) · (λg′St−1,Xt(α))2 + sinh(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) · λg′′St−1,Xt(α)
≤ cosh(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) · (λg′St−1,Xt(α))2 + cosh(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) · λgSt−1,Xt(α) · λg′′St−1,Xt(α)
= λ2 · cosh(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) · (g2St−1,XT )′′(α)
≤ σλ2B2 · cosh(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) ,
because (g2St−1,XT )
′′(α) = G′′(St−1 + αXt)(Xt, Xt) ≤ σ‖Xt‖2 ≤ σB2.
Case 2: sign(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) 6= sign(g′′St−1,Xt(α)). In this case, we simply have,
cosh(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) · (λg′St−1,Xt(α))2 + sinh(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) · λg′′St−1,Xt(α)
≤ cosh(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) · (λg′St−1,Xt(α))2
≤ λ2B2 · cosh(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) ,
because, by Lipschitz property of G, we have
|g′St−1,Xt(α)| = |G′(St−1 + αXt)(Xt)| ≤ ‖G′(St−1 + αXt)‖? · ‖Xt‖ ≤ 1 ·B .
Thus, we always have,
cosh(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) · (λg′St−1,Xt(α))2 + sinh(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) · λg′′St−1,Xt(α) ≤ σλ2B2 · cosh(λgSt−1,Xt(α)) .
Plugging this into (33), we get
φ′′(α) ≤ σλ2B2Et−1 [cosh(λG(St−1 + αXt))]
≤ σλ2B2Et−1 [cosh(λG(St−1) + λα‖Xt‖)]
≤ σλ2B2Et−1 [cosh(λG(St−1)) · exp(λα‖Xt‖)]
≤ σλ2B2 · cosh(λG(St−1)) · exp(λαB)
= σλ2B2 · Zt−1 · exp(λαB) .
Note that φ′(0) = Et−1 [G′(St−1)(Xt)] = G′(St−1)(Et−1 [Xt]) = 0 by the MDS property. Thus,
φ′(β) =
∫ β
y=0
φ′′(y)dy
and therefore
Zt = φ(1) = φ(0) +
∫ 1
β=0
φ′(β)dβ
= Zt−1 +
∫ 1
β=0
∫ β
y=0
φ′′(y)dydβ
= Zt−1 +
∫ 1
y=0
∫ 1
β=y
φ′′(y)dβdy
= Zt−1 +
∫ 1
y=0
φ′′(y)(1− y)dy
≤ Zt−1 ·
(
1 + σλ2B2
∫ 1
y=0
exp(λBy)(1− y)dy
)
= ZT−1 · (1 + σ(exp(λB)− 1− λB))
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Now that we have control over E [cosh(λG(ST ))], the following control on m.g.f. is immediate.
Corollary 45. Under the same conditions as previous lemma,
E [exp(λG(ST ))] ≤ 2 cT .
Moreover,
P (G(ST ) > ) ≤ 2 exp
(
− 
2
4TσB2
)
whenever T > /(2σB).
Proof. The first inequality follows by noting that cosh(x) = (exp(x) + exp(−x))/2 ≥ exp(x)/2.
For the second inequality,
P (G(ST ) > ) = P (exp(λG(ST )) > exp(λ))
≤ exp(−λ)E [exp(λG(ST ))]
≤ 2 exp(−λ)(1 + σ(exp(λB)− 1− λB))T
≤ 2 exp {−λ+ T log(1 + σ(exp(λB)− 1− λB))}
≤ 2 exp {−λ+ Tσ(exp(λB)− 1− λB)}
≤ 2 exp{−λ+ Tσλ2B2}
where the last inequality is valid for any λ ≤ 1/B. Optimizing over λ, we let
λ =

2TσB2
,
which yields the desired upper bound. The condition λ ≤ 1/B is satisfied whenever T > /(2σB).
With control on the m.g.f., a Massart style union bound argument at the level of expectations is immediate.
Theorem 46. Suppose {Xγt }Tt=0 is a family of MDS indexed by γ in some finite set Γ. Suppose for each
γ, t, ‖Xγt ‖ ≤ B a.s. Then, we have, for any T ≥ log(2|Γ|)/σ,
E
[
max
γ∈Γ
G(SγT )
]
≤ 2B
√
σ log(2|Γ|)T ,
where SγT =
∑T
t=1X
γ
t .
Proof. Fix λ > 0. Then,
exp
(
λE
[
max
γ∈Γ
G(SγT )
])
≤ E
[
exp(λmax
γ∈Γ
G(SγT ))
]
= E
[
max
γ∈Γ
exp(λG(SγT ))
]
≤ E
∑
γ∈Γ
exp(λG(SγT ))

≤ 2|Γ| · (1 + σ(exp(λB)− 1− λB))T .
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Taking logs and dividing by λ gives,
E
[
max
γ∈Γ
G(SγT )
]
≤ log(2|Γ|) + T log(1 + σ(exp(λB)− 1− λB))
λ
≤ log(2|Γ|) + Tσ(exp(λB)− 1− λB)
λ
≤ log(2|Γ|) + Tσλ
2B2
λ
,
where the last inequality is valid for any λ ≤ 1/B. Optimizing over λ, we choose λ = √log(2|Γ|)/TσB2
which is less than 1/B under the condition T ≥ log(2|Γ|/σ). Plugging this in gives,
E
[
max
γ∈Γ
G(SγT )
]
≤ 2B
√
σ log(2|Γ|)T .
Lemma 47. If F is a non-negative real-valued random variable and P(F > ) ≤ 2 exp
{
−T22c
}
, then
EF ≤
√
2pic/T .
More generally, if P(F > a+ ) ≤ 2N exp
{
− 2b2
}
for  >
√
4 log(2N)
b , then
EF ≤ a+
(√
log(2N) + 1
)√4
b
.
Proof.
EF =
∫ ∞
0
P(F > )d ≤ 2
∫ ∞
0
exp
{
−T
2
2c
}
d = 2
√
2pic
T
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
0
exp{−u2/2}du =
√
2pic
T
.
For the second statement,
EF =
∫ ∞
0
P(F > a+ )d ≤ a+ x+
∫ ∞
x
P(F > a+ )d.
Choose x =
√
4 log(2N)
b . For  > x, it holds that − b
2
2 + log(2N) ≤ − b
2
4 . Thus,
EF ≤ a+
√
4 log(2N)
b
+
∫ ∞
0
exp
{
−b
2
4
}
d =
√
4 log(2N)
b
+
√
4pi
b
1√
2pi
∫ ∞
0
exp{−u2/2}du.
B A General Triplex Inequality
Here we make the observation that the two versions of the triplex inequality, namely the expected (Theorem 1)
and high probability (Theorem 27) versions, are special cases of a general triplex inequality which bounds
the value of a “Γ-game” defined as:
VΓT (`,ΦT ) = inf
q1
sup
x1
E
f1∼q1
. . . inf
qT
sup
xT
E
fT∼qT
Γ
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))}
)
(34)
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The expectation and high-probability games are recovered by choosing Γ(x) = x and Γ(x) = 1 {x > θ}
respectively. We now state and prove the general triplex inequality4.
Theorem 48 (General Triplex Inequality). If Γ satisfies
Γ(x+ y + z) ≤ Λ(x) + Λ(y) + Λ(z)
for some Λ : R→ R, then we have,
VΓT (`,ΦT ) ≤ sup
D
ED [Λ (B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT )))]
+ sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
Λ
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))}
)
+ sup
D
ED
[
Λ
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))}
)]
where D ranges over distributions over sequences (x1, f1), . . . , (xT , fT ).
Proof. The value of the game VΓT (`,ΦT ), defined in (34), is
VΓT (`,ΦT )
= inf
q1
sup
p1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . inf
qT
sup
pT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[
Γ
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))}
)]
= sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[
Γ
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))}
)]
via an application of the minimax theorem. Adding and subtracting terms to the expression above leads to
VΓT (`,ΦT ) = sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[Γ (B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))
+ sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))}
)]
≤ sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[Γ (B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))
+ sup
φ∈ΦT
{
B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))
}
+ sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))}
)]
≤ sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[Λ (B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT )))
+Λ
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
{
B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))
})
+Λ
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))}
)]
4To be precise, the expectation version of the Triplex inequality presented in Theorem 1 is slightly different, as the expectation
is taken outside of B. Modulo this difference, the proofs are identical.
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At this point, we would like to break up the expression into three terms. To do so, notice that expectation
is linear and sup is a convex function, while for the infimum,
inf
a
[C1(a) + C2(a) + C3(a)] ≤
[
sup
a
C1(a)
]
+
[
inf
a
C2(a)
]
+
[
sup
a
C3(a)
]
for functions C1, C2, C3. We use these properties of inf, sup, and expectation, starting from the inside of the
nested expression and splitting the expression in three parts. We arrive at
VΓT (`,ΦT )
≤ sup
p1
sup
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
sup
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[Λ (B(`(f1, x1), . . . , `(fT , xT ))−B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT )))]
+ sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[
Λ
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))}
)]
+ sup
p1
sup
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
sup
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[
Λ
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
{B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(f1, x1), . . . , `φT (fT , xT ))}
)]
As mentioned in the corresponding proof of Theorem 1, the replacement of infima by suprema in the first
and third terms appears to be a loose step and, indeed, one can pick a particular response strategy {q∗t }
instead of passing to the supremum.
Consider the second term in the above decomposition. Clearly,
sup
p1
inf
q1
E
f1∼q1
x1∼p1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
E
fT∼qT
xT∼pT
[
Λ
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))
)]
= sup
p1
inf
q1
. . . sup
pT
inf
qT
Λ
(
sup
φ∈ΦT
B(`(q1, p1), . . . , `(qT , pT ))−B(`φ1(q1, p1), . . . , `φT (qT , pT ))
)
because the objective does not depend on the random draws.
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